# Post-AGI Economies: Autonomy and the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.21216 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.21216/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 27 of its 74 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 23 Apr 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 27 of 27)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [Voyager: An Open-Ended Embodied Agent with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16291/) (2023)
- [AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.08155/) (2023)
- [Concrete Problems in AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.06565/) (2016)
- [Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15217/) (2023)
- [Artificial Intelligence, Values and Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.09768/) (2020)
- [Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.03137/) (2016)
- [Measuring Progress on Scalable Oversight for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.03540/) (2022)
- [Harms from Increasingly Agentic Algorithmic Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.10329/) (2023)
- [ELEPHANT: Measuring and understanding social sycophancy in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.13995/) (2025)
- [Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.08708/) (2023)
- [Levels of AGI for Operationalizing Progress on the Path to AGI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.02462/) (2023)
- [Could a Large Language Model be Conscious?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.07103/) (2023)
- [Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.04268/) (2018)
- [Levels of Autonomy for AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.12469/) (2025)
- [The impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.05377/) (2023)
- [An Economy of AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.01063/) (2025)
- [Intelligent AI Delegation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.11865/) (2026)
- [Scenarios for the Transition to AGI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.12107/) (2024)
- [A Pragmatic View of AI Personhood](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.26396/) (2025)
- [Economic Policy Challenges for the Age of AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.13168/) (2024)
- [Some Simple Economics of AGI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.20946/) (2026)
- [AI Wellbeing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.11913/) (2025)
- [Time, Identity and Consciousness in Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.09043/) (2026)
- [Delegation and Verification Under AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.02961/) (2026)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Post-AGI Economies: Superposition and the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.08267/) (2026)
- [A New Theory of Value for Post-AGI Economics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.01432/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics assumes that welfare-bearing agents are autonomous and implicitly relies on a binary distinction between autonomy and instrumentality. Welfare subjects are those who have autonomy and therefore the capacity to choose and enter into utility comparisons, while everything else does not. In post-AGI economies this presupposition becomes nontrivial because artificial systems may exhibit varying degrees of autonomy, functioning as tools, delegates, strategic market actors, manipulators of choice environments, or possible welfare subjects. We argue that the theorem ought to be subject to an autonomy qualification where the impact of these changes in autonomy assumptions is incorporated. Using a minimal general-equilibrium model with autonomy-conditioned welfare, welfare-status assignment, delegation accounting, and verification institutions, we set out conditions for which autonomy-complete competitive equilibrium is autonomy-Pareto efficient. The classical theorem is recovered as the low-autonomy limit.