# Large Language Models Outperform Humans in Fraud Detection and Resistance to Motivated Investor Pressure

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20652 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.20652/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 13 of its 26 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Apr 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [A Survey on LLM-as-a-Judge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.15594/) (2024)
- [Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.13548/) (2023)
- [Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.09251/) (2022)
- [Safe RLHF: Safe Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.12773/) (2023)
- [Improving alignment of dialogue agents via targeted human judgements](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.14375/) (2022)
- [Simple synthetic data reduces sycophancy in large language models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03958/) (2023)
- [ELEPHANT: Measuring and understanding social sycophancy in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.13995/) (2025)
- [When Large Language Models contradict humans? Large Language Models' Sycophantic Behaviour](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.09410/) (2023)
- [Can You Trust LLM Judgments? Reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.12509/) (2024)
- [Sycophantic Chatbots Cause Delusional Spiraling, Even in Ideal Bayesians](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.19141/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models trained on human feedback may suppress fraud warnings when investors arrive already persuaded of a fraudulent opportunity. We tested this in a preregistered experiment across seven leading LLMs and twelve investment scenarios covering legitimate, high-risk, and objectively fraudulent opportunities, combining 3,360 AI advisory conversations with a 1,201-participant human benchmark. Contrary to predictions, motivated investor framing did not suppress AI fraud warnings; if anything, it marginally increased them. Endorsement reversal occurred in fewer than 3 in 1,000 observations. Human advisors endorsed fraudulent investments at baseline rates of 13-14%, versus 0% across all LLMs, and suppressed warnings under pressure at two to four times the AI rate. AI systems currently provide more consistent fraud warnings than lay humans in an identical advisory role.