# A Quasi-Experimental Developer Study of Security Training in LLM-Assisted Web Application Development

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.17763 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.17763/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 27 of its 35 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 20 Apr 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 27 of 27)

- [Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.09293/) (2021)
- [Large Language Models for Software Engineering: A Systematic Literature Review](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.10620/) (2023)
- [Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.03622/) (2022)
- [Lost at C: A User Study on the Security Implications of Large Language Model Code Assistants](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.09727/) (2022)
- [How Secure is Code Generated by ChatGPT?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.09655/) (2023)
- [Large Language Models for Cyber Security: A Systematic Literature Review](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.04760/) (2024)
- [LLMSecEval: A Dataset of Natural Language Prompts for Security Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.09384/) (2023)
- [CWEval: Outcome-driven Evaluation on Functionality and Security of LLM Code Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.08200/) (2025)
- [BaxBench: Can LLMs Generate Correct and Secure Backends?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.11844/) (2025)
- [SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.00889/) (2023)
- [Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.02059/) (2023)
- [Prompting Techniques for Secure Code Generation: A Systematic Investigation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.07064/) (2024)
- [Chain-of-Thought Prompting of Large Language Models for Discovering and Fixing Software Vulnerabilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.17230/) (2024)
- [Using AI Assistants in Software Development: A Qualitative Study on Security Practices and Concerns](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.06371/) (2024)
- [How secure is AI-generated Code: A Large-Scale Comparison of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.18353/) (2024)
- [PromSec: Prompt Optimization for Secure Generation of Functional Source Code with Large Language Models (LLMs)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.12699/) (2024)
- [Security and Quality in LLM-Generated Code: A Multi-Language, Multi-Model Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.01853/) (2025)
- [Give LLMs a Security Course: Securing Retrieval-Augmented Code Generation via Knowledge Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.16429/) (2025)
- [A User-centered Security Evaluation of Copilot](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.06587/) (2023)
- [Benchmarking Prompt Engineering Techniques for Secure Code Generation with GPT Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.06039/) (2025)
- [An Investigation into Misuse of Java Security APIs by Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.03823/) (2024)
- [DeVAIC: A Tool for Security Assessment of AI-generated Code](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.07548/) (2024)
- [A Study of Vulnerability Repair in JavaScript Programs with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.13193/) (2024)
- [How Well Do Large Language Models Serve as End-to-End Secure Code Agents for Python?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.10495/) (2024)
- [Can You Really Trust Code Copilots? Evaluating Large Language Models from a Code Security Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.10494/) (2025)
- [Software Security during Modern Code Review: The Developer's Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.04261/) (2022)
- [Evaluating Large Language Models in Vulnerability Detection Under Variable Context Windows](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.00064/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This paper presents a controlled quasi-experimental developer study examining whether a layer-based security training package is associated with improved security quality in LLM-assisted implementation of an identity-centric Java Spring Boot backend. The study uses a mixed design with a within-subject pre-training versus post-training comparison and an exploratory between-subject expertise factor. Twelve developers completed matched runs under a common interface, fixed model configuration, counterbalanced task sets, and a shared starter project. Security outcomes were assessed via independent manual validation of submitted repositories by the first and second authors. The primary participant-level endpoint was a severity-weighted validated-weakness score. The post-training condition showed a significant paired reduction under an exact Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p = 0.0059). In aggregate, validated weaknesses decreased from 162 to 111 (31.5%), the severity-weighted burden decreased from 432 to 267 (38.2%), and critical findings decreased from 24 to 5 (79.2%). The largest reductions were in authorization and object access (53.3%) and in authentication, credential policy, and recovery weaknesses (44.7%). Session and browser trust-boundary issues showed minimal change, while sensitive-data and cryptographic weaknesses showed only marginal improvement. These results suggest that, under the tested conditions, post-training runs reduce validated security burden in LLM-assisted backend development without modifying the model. They do not support replacing secure defaults, static analysis, expert review, or operational hardening.