# Toward Explanatory Equilibrium: Verifiable Reasoning as a Coordination Mechanism under Asymmetric Information

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.09917 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.09917/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Reasoning for agents, planning and code, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning.
- Builds on 1 of its 35 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 10 Apr 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM reasoning / [Reasoning for agents, planning and code](https://mlsanity.com/lr/reasoning-for-agents-planning-and-code/)
- LLM agents and tool use / [Financial trading and forecasting agents](https://mlsanity.com/agents/financial-trading-and-forecasting-agents/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.11432/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [More Claims, Less Evidence: Bounded Verification of AI-Generated Digital Knowledge Artifacts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.05547/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

LLM-based agents increasingly coordinate decisions in multi-agent systems, often attaching natural-language reasoning to actions. However, reasoning is neither free nor automatically reliable: it incurs computational cost and, without verification, may degenerate into persuasive cheap talk. We introduce Explanatory Equilibrium as a design principle for explanation-aware multi-agent systems and study a regime in which agents exchange structured reasoning artifacts-auditable claims paired with concise text-while receivers apply bounded verification through probabilistic audits under explicit resource constraints. We contribute (i) a minimal mechanism-level exchange-audit model linking audit intensity, misreporting incentives, and reasoning costs, and (ii) empirical evidence from a finance-inspired LLM setting involving a Trader and a Risk Manager. In ambiguous, borderline proposals, auditable artifacts prevent the cost of silence driven by conservative validation under asymmetric information: without structured claims, approval and welfare collapse. By contrast, structured reasoning unlocks coordination while maintaining consistently low bad-approval rates across audit intensities, audit budgets, and incentive regimes. Our results suggest that scalable, safety-preserving coordination in LLM-based multi-agent systems depends not only on audit strength, but more fundamentally on disciplined externalization of reasoning into partially verifiable artifacts.