# Social Meaning in Large Language Models: Structure, Magnitude, and Pragmatic Prompting

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.02512 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.02512/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 8 of its 30 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Apr 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.11903/) (2022)
- [Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.17548/) (2023)
- [Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.06899/) (2022)
- [Evaluating the Moral Beliefs Encoded in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.14324/) (2023)
- [PUB: A Pragmatics Understanding Benchmark for Assessing LLMs' Pragmatics Capabilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.07078/) (2024)
- [This human study did not involve human subjects: Validating LLM simulations as behavioral evidence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.15785/) (2026)
- [Non-literal Understanding of Number Words by Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.06204/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit human-like patterns of pragmatic and social reasoning. This paper addresses two related questions: do LLMs approximate human social meaning not only qualitatively but also quantitatively, and can prompting strategies informed by pragmatic theory improve this approximation? To address the first, we introduce two calibration-focused metrics distinguishing structural fidelity from magnitude calibration: the Effect Size Ratio (ESR) and the Calibration Deviation Score (CDS). To address the second, we derive prompting conditions from two pragmatic assumptions: that social meaning arises from reasoning over linguistic alternatives, and that listeners infer speaker knowledge states and communicative motives. Applied to a case study on numerical (im)precision across three frontier LLMs, we find that all models reliably reproduce the qualitative structure of human social inferences but differ substantially in magnitude calibration. Prompting models to reason about speaker knowledge and motives most consistently reduces magnitude deviation, while prompting for alternative-awareness tends to amplify exaggeration. Combining both components is the only intervention that improves all calibration-sensitive metrics across all models, though fine-grained magnitude calibration remains only partially resolved. LLMs thus capture inferential structure while variably distorting inferential strength, and pragmatic theory provides a useful but incomplete handle for improving that approximation.