# T-MAP: Red-Teaming LLM Agents with Trajectory-aware Evolutionary Search

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.22341 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.22341/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 22 of its 30 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 21 Mar 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 22 of 22)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Qwen3 Embedding: Advancing Text Embedding and Reranking Through Foundation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.05176/) (2025)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [GLM-5: from Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.15763/) (2026)
- [Kimi K2.5: Visual Agentic Intelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.02276/) (2026)
- [Texygen: A Benchmarking Platform for Text Generation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.01886/) (2018)
- [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09024/) (2024)
- [Illuminating search spaces by mapping elites](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1504.04909/) (2015)
- [Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01833/) (2024)
- [Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.14470/) (2024)
- [R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.10019/) (2024)
- [Rainbow Teaming: Open-Ended Generation of Diverse Adversarial Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.16822/) (2024)
- [The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.09023/) (2025)
- [Chain of Attack: a Semantic-Driven Contextual Multi-Turn attacker for LLM](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.05610/) (2024)
- [Adversarial Reasoning at Jailbreaking Time](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.01633/) (2025)
- [SIRAJ: Diverse and Efficient Red-Teaming for LLM Agents via Distilled Structured Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.26037/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [What Makes an LLM a Good Optimizer? A Trajectory Analysis of LLM-Guided Evolutionary Search](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.19440/) (2026)
- [Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.11698/) (2026)
- [Automatic Hard Example Synthesis with Multi-Level Agentic Data Curation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.14256/) (2026)
- [Governing Execution Risk in Agentic AI Systems: A Trajectory-Guided Framework for Red Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.04018/) (2026)
- [Breadcrumbing Search Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.04565/) (2026)
- [Rethinking Indirect Prompt Injection as a Test-Time Search Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.04495/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

While prior red-teaming efforts have focused on eliciting harmful text outputs from large language models (LLMs), such approaches fail to capture agent-specific vulnerabilities that emerge through multi-step tool execution, particularly in rapidly growing ecosystems such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP). To address this gap, we propose a trajectory-aware evolutionary search method, T-MAP, which leverages execution trajectories to guide the discovery of adversarial prompts. Our approach enables the automatic generation of attacks that not only bypass safety guardrails but also reliably realize harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Empirical evaluations across diverse MCP environments demonstrate that T-MAP substantially outperforms baselines in attack realization rate (ARR) and remains effective against frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM-5, thereby revealing previously underexplored vulnerabilities in autonomous LLM agents. Code is available at https://github.com/pwnhyo/T-MAP.