# I Can't Believe It's Corrupt: Evaluating Corruption in Multi-Agent Governance Systems

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.18894 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.18894/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 8 of its 33 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 19 Mar 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Social simulation and multi-agent debate](https://mlsanity.com/agents/social-simulation-and-multi-agent-debate/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [Concrete Problems in AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.06565/) (2016)
- [Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.03037/) (2017)
- [Open Problems in Cooperative AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.08630/) (2020)
- [Generative agent-based modeling with actions grounded in physical, social, or digital space using Concordia](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.03664/) (2023)
- [Moloch's Bargain: Emergent Misalignment When LLMs Compete for Audiences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.06105/) (2025)
- [Talk, Judge, Cooperate: Gossip-Driven Indirect Reciprocity in Self-Interested LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.07777/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models are increasingly proposed as autonomous agents for high-stakes public workflows, yet we lack systematic evidence about whether they would follow institutional rules when granted authority. We present evidence that integrity in institutional AI should be treated as a pre-deployment requirement rather than a post-deployment assumption. We evaluate multi-agent governance simulations in which agents occupy formal governmental roles under different authority structures, and we score rule-breaking and abuse outcomes with an independent rubric-based judge across 28,112 transcript segments. While we advance this position, the core contribution is empirical: among models operating below saturation, governance structure is a stronger driver of corruption-related outcomes than model identity, with large differences across regimes and model--governance pairings. Lightweight safeguards can reduce risk in some settings but do not consistently prevent severe failures. These results imply that institutional design is a precondition for safe delegation: before real authority is assigned to LLM agents, systems should undergo stress testing under governance-like constraints with enforceable rules, auditable logs, and human oversight on high-impact actions.