# State-Dependent Safety Failures in Multi-Turn Language Model Interaction

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.15684 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.15684/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation.
- Builds on 31 of its 38 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 15 Mar 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/safety-alignment-and-jailbreak-attacks/)
- LLM safety and security / [Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails](https://mlsanity.com/safety/safety-alignment-refusal-and-guardrails/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 31)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [GPT-4o System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21276/) (2024)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11717/) (2024)
- [An Explanation of In-context Learning as Implicit Bayesian Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.02080/) (2021)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01318/) (2024)
- [Catastrophic Jailbreak of Open-source LLMs via Exploiting Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06987/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06387/) (2023)
- [Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01833/) (2024)
- [DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.03191/) (2023)
- [Scalable and Transferable Black-Box Jailbreaks for Language Models via Persona Modulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.03348/) (2023)
- [COLD-Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs with Stealthiness and Controllability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08679/) (2024)
- [X-Teaming: Multi-Turn Jailbreaks and Defenses with Adaptive Multi-Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.13203/) (2025)
- [Chain of Attack: a Semantic-Driven Contextual Multi-Turn attacker for LLM](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.05610/) (2024)
- [Speak Out of Turn: Safety Vulnerability of Large Language Models in Multi-turn Dialogue](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.17262/) (2024)
- [Reasoning-Augmented Conversation for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.11054/) (2025)
- [Beyond Single-Turn: A Survey on Multi-Turn Interactions with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.04717/) (2025)
- [CodeAttack: Code-Based Adversarial Attacks for Pre-trained Programming Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.00052/) (2022)
- [A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.04893/) (2024)
- [A Survey on Multi-Turn Interaction Capabilities of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.09959/) (2025)
- [Mind the Inconspicuous: Revealing the Hidden Weakness in Aligned LLMs' Refusal Boundaries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.20653/) (2024)
- [Foot In The Door: Understanding Large Language Model Jailbreaking via Cognitive Psychology](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.15690/) (2024)
- [A Representation Engineering Perspective on the Effectiveness of Multi-Turn Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.02956/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [SafeDream: Safety World Model for Proactive Early Jailbreak Detection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.16824/) (2026)
- [Mitigating Scaffolding Collapse in Socratic Tutors via Representation Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.19371/) (2026)
- [Jailbreak Context Lingers: Divergent Safety Routing and Its Cross-Task Predictability in Tool Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.34686/) (2026)
- [TRACE: Trajectory Return Attribution and Contrastive Erasure for Multi-Turn Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.01323/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Safety alignment in large language models is typically evaluated under isolated queries, yet real-world use is inherently multi-turn. Although multi-turn jailbreaks are empirically effective, the structure of conversational safety failure remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we study safety failures from a state-space perspective and show that many multi-turn safety failures in current safety-aligned language models arise from contextual state evolution, a regime that is not fully captured by isolated prompt-level analyses alone. We introduce STAR, a state-oriented diagnostic framework that treats dialogue history as a state transition operator and enables controlled analysis of safety behavior along interaction trajectories. Rather than optimizing attack strength, STAR provides a principled probe of how aligned models traverse the safety boundary under autoregressive conditioning. Across multiple frontier language models, we find that systems that appear robust under static evaluation can undergo rapid and reproducible safety collapse under structured multi-turn interaction. Mechanistic analysis reveals monotonic drift away from refusal-related representations and abrupt phase transitions induced by role-conditioned context. Together, these findings motivate viewing language model safety as a dynamic, state-dependent process defined over conversational trajectories.
