# Defensible Design for OpenClaw: Securing Autonomous Tool-Invoking Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.13151 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.13151/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 13 Mar 2026.

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [The Self Driving Portfolio: Agentic Architecture for Institutional Asset Management](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.02279/) (2026)
- [Autonomous Event-Driven Multi-Agent Orchestration for Enterprise AI at Scale](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.20058/) (2026)
- [OpenClaw and Ollama in Agentic AI: Toward Fully Autonomous and Scalable AI Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.28629/) (2026)
- [RAGas: Retrieval-Augmented Gas Optimization for Smart Contracts with Continuous Knowledge Integration](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.15857/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

OpenClaw-like agents offer substantial productivity benefits, yet they are insecure by default because they combine untrusted inputs, autonomous action, extensibility, and privileged system access within a single execution loop. We use OpenClaw as an exemplar of a broader class of agents that interact with interfaces, manipulate files, invoke tools, and install extensions in real operating environments. Consequently, their security should be treated as a software engineering problem rather than as a product-specific concern. To address these architectural vulnerabilities, we propose a blueprint for defensible design. We present a risk taxonomy, secure engineering principles, and a practical research agenda to institutionalize safety in agent construction. Our goal is to transition the community focus from isolated vulnerability patching toward systematic defensive engineering and robust deployment practices.