# CAGE: A Framework for Culturally Adaptive Red-Teaming Benchmark Generation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20170 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.20170/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 40 of its 47 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 9 Feb 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 40)

- [GPT-4 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08774/) (2023)
- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.13971/) (2023)
- [Qwen2.5 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.15115/) (2024)
- [GPT-4o System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21276/) (2024)
- [Qwen Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.16609/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Gemma 2: Improving Open Language Models at a Practical Size](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.00118/) (2024)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [RealToxicityPrompts: Evaluating Neural Toxic Degeneration in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.11462/) (2020)
- [Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03693/) (2023)
- [Ethical and social risks of harm from Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.04359/) (2021)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.07858/) (2022)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18495/) (2024)
- [Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1605.07277/) (2016)
- [Multilingual Jailbreak Challenges in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06474/) (2023)
- [SALAD-Bench: A Hierarchical and Comprehensive Safety Benchmark for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.05044/) (2024)
- [AutoDAN-Turbo: A Lifelong Agent for Strategy Self-Exploration to Jailbreak LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.05295/) (2024)
- [Do-Not-Answer: A Dataset for Evaluating Safeguards in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.13387/) (2023)
- [Model evaluation for extreme risks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15324/) (2023)
- [ALERT: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Assessing Large Language Models' Safety through Red Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.08676/) (2024)
- [Red teaming ChatGPT via Jailbreaking: Bias, Robustness, Reliability and Toxicity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.12867/) (2023)
- [Review of Large Vision Models and Visual Prompt Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.00855/) (2023)
- [AIR-Bench 2024: A Safety Benchmark Based on Risk Categories from Regulations and Policies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.17436/) (2024)
- [KoBBQ: Korean Bias Benchmark for Question Answering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16778/) (2023)
- [Common Sense Beyond English: Evaluating and Improving Multilingual Language Models for Commonsense Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.06937/) (2021)
- [SG-Bench: Evaluating LLM Safety Generalization Across Diverse Tasks and Prompt Types](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21965/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Korean Culture into LLM Alignment: Toward Cultural Coherence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.06797/) (2026)
- [ROK-FORTRESS: Measuring the Effect of Geopolitical Transcreation for National Security and Public Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14152/) (2026)
- [Culturally-Adapted Red-Teaming Across East and Southeast Asian Contexts: A Methodological and Comparative Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.09178/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Existing red-teaming benchmarks, when adapted to new languages via direct translation, fail to capture socio-technical vulnerabilities rooted in local culture and law, creating a critical blind spot in LLM safety evaluation. To address this gap, we introduce CAGE (Culturally Adaptive Generation), a framework that systematically adapts the adversarial intent of proven red-teaming prompts to new cultural contexts. At the core of CAGE is the Semantic Mold, a novel approach that disentangles a prompt's adversarial structure from its cultural content. This approach enables the modeling of realistic, localized threats rather than testing for simple jailbreaks. As a representative example, we demonstrate our framework by creating KoRSET, a Korean benchmark, which proves more effective at revealing vulnerabilities than direct translation baselines. CAGE offers a scalable solution for developing meaningful, context-aware safety benchmarks across diverse cultures. Our dataset and evaluation rubrics are publicly available at https://github.com/selectstar-ai/CAGE-paper. (WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that can be offensive in nature.)