# OMNI-LEAK: Orchestrator Multi-Agent Network Induced Data Leakage

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13477 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.13477/

## Key facts

- Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 26 of its 42 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 Feb 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 26 of 26)

- [Attention Is All You Need](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03762/) (2017)
- [Language Models are Few-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14165/) (2020)
- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.11366/) (2023)
- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.11432/) (2023)
- [ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16789/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15334/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09527/) (2022)
- [Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05499/) (2023)
- [Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.13860/) (2023)
- [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09024/) (2024)
- [Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.09932/) (2024)
- [Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.14143/) (2025)
- [Prompt Infection: LLM-to-LLM Prompt Injection within Multi-Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.07283/) (2024)
- [OWL: Optimized Workforce Learning for General Multi-Agent Assistance in Real-World Task Automation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.23885/) (2025)
- [Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.15541/) (2025)
- [Breaking Agents: Compromising Autonomous LLM Agents Through Malfunction Amplification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.20859/) (2024)
- [SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.15740/) (2025)
- [Multi-Agent Systems Execute Arbitrary Malicious Code](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.12188/) (2025)
- [Adversaries Can Misuse Combinations of Safe Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.14595/) (2024)
- [Engineering LLM Powered Multi-agent Framework for Autonomous CloudOps](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.08243/) (2025)
- [Towards Unifying Quantitative Security Benchmarking for Multi Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.21146/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [Formal Analysis and Supply Chain Security for Agentic AI Skills](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.00195/) (2026)
- [Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10749/) (2026)
- [Semantic Intent Fragmentation: A Single-Shot Compositional Attack on Multi-Agent AI Pipelines](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.08608/) (2026)
- [The Interlocutor Effect: Why LLMs Leak More Personal Data to Agents Than Humans](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.09844/) (2026)
- [SoK: When Safe Agents Fail Together: The Security of Multi Agent LLM Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.00595/) (2026)
- [Rethinking Agent Security as a Networking Problem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.12172/) (2026)
- [MADBench: Benchmarking the Security of Multi-Agent Debate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.39146/) (2026)
- [Lineage-Aware Memory Governance: A Derivation-Gated Framework for Privacy-Preserving Column-Level Access Control in Enterprise AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.07258/) (2026)
- [APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional Workspaces](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.13623/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more capable, their coordinated use in the form of multi-agent systems is anticipated to emerge as a practical paradigm. Prior work has examined the safety and misuse risks associated with agents. However, much of this has focused on the single-agent case and/or setups missing basic engineering safeguards such as access control, revealing a scarcity of threat modeling in multi-agent systems. We investigate the security vulnerabilities of a popular multi-agent pattern known as the orchestrator setup, in which a central agent decomposes and delegates tasks to specialized agents. Through red-teaming a concrete setup representative of a likely future use case, we demonstrate a novel attack vector, OMNI-LEAK, that compromises several agents to leak sensitive data through a single indirect prompt injection, even in the presence of data access control. We report the susceptibility of frontier models to different categories of attacks, finding that both reasoning and non-reasoning models are vulnerable, even when the attacker lacks insider knowledge of the implementation details. Our work highlights the importance of safety research to generalize from single-agent to multi-agent settings, in order to reduce the serious risks of real-world privacy breaches and financial losses and overall public trust in AI agents.