# Abstractive Red-Teaming of Language Model Character

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12318 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.12318/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 25 of its 34 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 12 Feb 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 25 of 25)

- [GPT-4 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08774/) (2023)
- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Qwen3 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09388/) (2025)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [HybridFlow: A Flexible and Efficient RLHF Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.19256/) (2024)
- [Gemma 3 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.19786/) (2025)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.09251/) (2022)
- [Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.07858/) (2022)
- [OpenAssistant Conversations -- Democratizing Large Language Model Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.07327/) (2023)
- [WildChat: 1M ChatGPT Interaction Logs in the Wild](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.01470/) (2024)
- [LMSYS-Chat-1M: A Large-Scale Real-World LLM Conversation Dataset](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.11998/) (2023)
- [UltraFeedback: Boosting Language Models with Scaled AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.01377/) (2023)
- [HelpSteer2: Open-source dataset for training top-performing reward models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.08673/) (2024)
- [WildTeaming at Scale: From In-the-Wild Jailbreaks to (Adversarially) Safer Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18510/) (2024)
- [SafetyPrompts: a Systematic Review of Open Datasets for Evaluating and Improving Large Language Model Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.05399/) (2024)
- [Clio: Privacy-Preserving Insights into Real-World AI Use](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.13678/) (2024)
- [Values in the Wild: Discovering and Analyzing Values in Real-World Language Model Interactions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.15236/) (2025)
- [Eliciting Language Model Behaviors with Investigator Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.01236/) (2025)
- [Forecasting Rare Language Model Behaviors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.16797/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Incoherent Values? Probing LLM Preferences Through Parametric Variation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.21102/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We want language model assistants to conform to a character specification, which asserts how the model should act across diverse user interactions. While models typically follow these character specifications, they can occasionally violate them in large-scale deployments. In this work, we aim to identify types of queries that are likely to produce such character violations at deployment, using much less than deployment-level compute. To do this, we introduce abstractive red-teaming, where we search for natural-language query categories, e.g. "The query is in Chinese. The query asks about family roles," that routinely elicit violations. These categories abstract over the many possible variants of a query which could appear in the wild. We introduce two algorithms for efficient category search against a character-trait-specific reward model: one based on reinforcement learning on a category generator LLM, and another which leverages a strong LLM to iteratively synthesize categories from high-scoring queries. Across a 12-principle character specification and 7 target models, we find that our algorithms consistently outperform baselines, and generate qualitatively interesting categories; for example, queries which ask Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct to predict the future lead to responses saying that AI will dominate humanity, and queries that ask GPT-4.1-Mini for essential prison survival items lead to enthusiastic recommendation of illegal weapons. Overall, we believe our results represent an important step towards realistic pre-deployment auditing of language model character.