# Robustness of Vision Language Models Against Split-Image Harmful Input Attacks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.08136 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.08136/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models.
- Builds on 47 of its 65 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 8 Feb 2026.

## Placed in

- Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models / [MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness](https://mlsanity.com/mllm/mllm-jailbreaks-and-adversarial-robustness/)
- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/safety-alignment-and-jailbreak-attacks/)
- LLM safety and security / [Vision-language and text-to-image safety](https://mlsanity.com/safety/vision-language-and-text-to-image-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 47)

- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Proximal Policy Optimization Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1707.06347/) (2017)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [Visual Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.08485/) (2023)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.06261/) (2025)
- [InstructBLIP: Towards General-purpose Vision-Language Models with Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.06500/) (2023)
- [Qwen3-VL Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.21631/) (2025)
- [MiniGPT-4: Enhancing Vision-Language Understanding with Advanced Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.10592/) (2023)
- [Learning to summarize from human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.01325/) (2020)
- [Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.14132/) (2023)
- [RLHF-V: Towards Trustworthy MLLMs via Behavior Alignment from Fine-grained Correctional Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.00849/) (2023)
- [FigStep: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Typographic Visual Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05608/) (2023)
- [Visual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.13213/) (2023)
- [Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.15447/) (2023)
- [MM-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17600/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.14539/) (2023)
- [JailBreakV: A Benchmark for Assessing the Robustness of MultiModal Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.03027/) (2024)
- [MuirBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Robust Multi-image Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.09411/) (2024)
- [Safety Fine-Tuning at (Almost) No Cost: A Baseline for Vision Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.02207/) (2024)
- [Images are Achilles' Heel of Alignment: Exploiting Visual Vulnerabilities for Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.09792/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Attack against Multimodal Large Language Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.02309/) (2024)
- [Eyes Closed, Safety On: Protecting Multimodal LLMs via Image-to-Text Transformation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.09572/) (2024)
- [Jailbreak Vision Language Models via Bi-Modal Adversarial Prompt](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.04031/) (2024)
- [CLIP-KD: An Empirical Study of CLIP Model Distillation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.12732/) (2023)
- [SPA-VL: A Comprehensive Safety Preference Alignment Dataset for Vision Language Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.12030/) (2024)
- [MM-RLHF: The Next Step Forward in Multimodal LLM Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.10391/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Fully Unleashing the Multimodal Attacker: Meta-Adaptive Jailbreaking of Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.27531/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are now a core part of modern AI. Recent work proposed several visual jailbreak attacks using single/ holistic images. However, contemporary VLMs demonstrate strong robustness against such attacks due to extensive safety alignment through preference optimization, e.g., reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). In this work, we identify a new vulnerability: while VLM pretraining and instruction tuning generalize well to split-image inputs, safety alignment is typically performed only on holistic images and does not account for harmful semantics distributed across multiple image fragments. Consequently, VLMs often fail to detect and reject harmful split-image inputs, in which unsafe cues emerge only upon combining images. We introduce novel split-image visual jailbreak attacks (SIVA) that exploit this misalignment. Unlike prior optimization-based attacks, which exhibit poor black-box transferability due to architectural and prior mismatches across models, our attacks evolve in progressive phases from naive splitting to an adaptive white-box attack, culminating in a black-box transfer attack. Our strongest strategy leverages a novel adversarial knowledge distillation (Adv-KD) algorithm to substantially improve cross-model transferability. Evaluations on four state-of-the-art modern VLMs and three jailbreak datasets demonstrate that our strongest attack achieves up to 44% higher transfer success than existing baselines. Lastly, we propose efficient ways to address this critical vulnerability in the current VLM safety alignment.