# Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.07379 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.07379/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 16 of its 16 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 7 Feb 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 16 of 16)

- [GPT-4o System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21276/) (2024)
- [Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.06261/) (2025)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Qwen2.5-Omni Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.20215/) (2025)
- [Qwen2-Audio Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.10759/) (2024)
- [SpeechGPT: Empowering Large Language Models with Intrinsic Cross-Modal Conversational Abilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.11000/) (2023)
- [SALMONN: Towards Generic Hearing Abilities for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.13289/) (2023)
- [FigStep: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Typographic Visual Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05608/) (2023)
- [VoiceBench: Benchmarking LLM-Based Voice Assistants](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.17196/) (2024)
- [Voice Jailbreak Attacks Against GPT-4o](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.19103/) (2024)
- [AdvWave: Stealthy Adversarial Jailbreak Attack against Large Audio-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.08608/) (2024)
- [Audio Is the Achilles' Heel: Red Teaming Audio Large Multimodal Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.23861/) (2024)
- [Multilingual and Multi-Accent Jailbreaking of Audio LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.01094/) (2025)
- [Jailbreak-AudioBench: In-Depth Evaluation and Analysis of Jailbreak Threats for Large Audio Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.13772/) (2025)
- [AudioJailbreak: Jailbreak Attacks against End-to-End Large Audio-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.14103/) (2025)
- [AHELM: A Holistic Evaluation of Audio-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.21376/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [From Acoustic Sensing to Physical Actions: A Comprehensive Survey of Security Risks in Edge-Deployed Audio LLM-Based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.15390/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

With the rapid advancement and adoption of Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs), voice agents are now being deployed in high-stakes domains such as banking, customer service, and IT support. However, their vulnerabilities to adversarial misuse still remain unexplored. While prior work has examined aspects of trustworthiness in ALLMs, such as harmful content generation and hallucination, systematic security evaluations of voice agents are still lacking. To address this gap, we propose Aegis, a red-teaming framework for the governance, integrity, and security of voice agents. Aegis models the realistic deployment pipeline of voice agents and designs structured adversarial scenarios of critical risks, including privacy leakage, privilege escalation, resource abuse, etc. We evaluate the framework through case studies in banking call centers, IT Support, and logistics. Our evaluation shows that while access controls mitigate data-level risks, voice agents remain vulnerable to behavioral attacks that cannot be addressed through access restrictions alone, even under strict access controls. We observe systematic differences across model families, with open-weight models exhibiting higher susceptibility, underscoring the need for layered defenses that combine access control, policy enforcement, and behavioral monitoring to secure next-generation voice agents.