# Mechanism Design for AI Overviews: Creator Incentives and Long-Term Profit

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.22493 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.22493/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 30 Jan 2026.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Market Design for AI: Beyond the Copyright Binary](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.12260/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The integration of AI Overviews into search engines enhances user experience but diverts traffic from content creators, potentially discouraging high-quality content creation and causing user attrition that undermines long-term search engine profit. To address this issue, we propose a game-theoretic model of creator competition with costly effort, characterize equilibrium behavior, and design two incentive mechanisms: a citation mechanism that references sources within an AI Overview, and a compensation mechanism that offers monetary rewards to creators. For both cases, we provide structural insights for profit-maximizing mechanisms. Evaluations parameterized by real click data show that although AI Overviews harm long-term search engine profit, interventions based on our proposed mechanisms can increase long-term profit across a range of realistic scenarios, pointing toward a more sustainable trajectory for AI-enhanced search ecosystems.