# Res-MIA: A Training-Free Resolution-Based Membership Inference Attack on Federated Learning Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.17378 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.17378/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Federated unlearning and poisoning, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 6 of its 18 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 24 Jan 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Federated unlearning and poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/safety/federated-unlearning-and-poisoning/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.05820/) (2016)
- [Membership Inference Attacks From First Principles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.03570/) (2021)
- [Advances and Open Challenges in Federated Foundation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.15381/) (2024)
- [Subject Membership Inference Attacks in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.03317/) (2022)
- [Active Membership Inference Attack under Local Differential Privacy in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12685/) (2023)
- [Recent Advances of Differential Privacy in Centralized Deep Learning: A Systematic Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.16398/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) pose a serious threat to the privacy of machine learning models by allowing adversaries to determine whether a specific data sample was included in the training set. Although federated learning (FL) is widely regarded as a privacy-aware training paradigm due to its decentralized nature, recent evidence shows that the final global model can still leak sensitive membership information through black-box access. In this paper, we introduce Res-MIA, a novel training-free and black-box membership inference attack that exploits the sensitivity of deep models to high-frequency input details. Res-MIA progressively degrades the input resolution using controlled downsampling and restoration operations, and analyzes the resulting confidence decay in the model's predictions. Our key insight is that training samples exhibit a significantly steeper confidence decline under resolution erosion compared to non-member samples, revealing a robust membership signal. Res-MIA requires no shadow models, no auxiliary data, and only a limited number of forward queries to the target model. We evaluate the proposed attack on a federated ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10, where it consistently outperforms existing training-free baselines and achieves an AUC of up to 0.88 with minimal computational overhead. These findings highlight frequency-sensitive overfitting as an important and previously underexplored source of privacy leakage in federated learning, and emphasize the need for privacy-aware model designs that reduce reliance on fine-grained, non-robust input features.
