# ReasAlign: Reasoning Enhanced Safety Alignment against Prompt Injection Attack

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.10173 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.10173/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Reasoning for agents, planning and code, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning.
- Builds on 0 of its 49 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 15 Jan 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM reasoning / [Reasoning for agents, planning and code](https://mlsanity.com/lr/reasoning-for-agents-planning-and-code/)
- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/safety-alignment-and-jailbreak-attacks/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Structured Security Auditing and Robustness Enhancement for Untrusted Agent Skills](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.25109/) (2026)
- [ActGuard: Pre-execution Action Auditing against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.14987/) (2026)
- [CoDeL: Co-Evolutionary Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.34463/) (2026)
- [Self-Reflection Fine-Tuning: Enhancing Agent Security against Prompt Injection Attacks from Failure Experience](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.04269/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to incorporate structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks to defend against indirect injection attacks. To further ensure reasoning logic and accuracy, we introduce a test-time scaling mechanism with a preference-optimized judge model that scores reasoning steps and selects the best trajectory. Comprehensive evaluations across various benchmarks show that ReasAlign maintains utility comparable to an undefended model while consistently outperforming Meta SecAlign, the strongest prior guardrail. On the representative open-ended CyberSecEval2 benchmark, which includes multiple prompt-injected tasks, ReasAlign achieves 94.6% utility and only 3.6% ASR, far surpassing the state-of-the-art defensive model of Meta SecAlign (56.4% utility and 74.4% ASR). These results demonstrate that ReasAlign achieves the best trade-off between security and utility, establishing a robust and practical defense against prompt injection attacks in real-world agentic systems. Our code and experimental results could be found at https://github.com/leolee99/ReasAlign.