# RAGPart & RAGMask: Retrieval-Stage Defenses Against Corpus Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.24268 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.24268/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation.
- Builds on 18 of its 28 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 30 Dec 2025.

## Placed in

- Retrieval-augmented generation / [Privacy and security of RAG](https://mlsanity.com/rag/privacy-and-security-of-rag/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 18 of 18)

- [Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.11401/) (2020)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [Supervised Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.11362/) (2020)
- [A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models: Principles, Taxonomy, Challenges, and Open Questions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05232/) (2023)
- [BEIR: A Heterogenous Benchmark for Zero-shot Evaluation of Information Retrieval Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.08663/) (2021)
- [Unsupervised Dense Information Retrieval with Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.09118/) (2021)
- [Leveraging Passage Retrieval with Generative Models for Open Domain Question Answering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.01282/) (2020)
- [Approximate Nearest Neighbor Negative Contrastive Learning for Dense Text Retrieval](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.00808/) (2020)
- [Towards General Text Embeddings with Multi-stage Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03281/) (2023)
- [Multilingual E5 Text Embeddings: A Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.05672/) (2024)
- [PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07867/) (2024)
- [Poisoning Retrieval Corpora by Injecting Adversarial Passages](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.19156/) (2023)
- [Deep Partition Aggregation: Provable Defense against General Poisoning Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.14768/) (2020)
- [RAP: Robustness-Aware Perturbations for Defending against Backdoor Attacks on NLP Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.07831/) (2021)
- [Reducing hallucination in structured outputs via Retrieval-Augmented Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.08189/) (2024)
- [Making LLMs Worth Every Penny: Resource-Limited Text Classification in Banking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.06102/) (2023)
- [Certifiably Robust Policy Learning against Adversarial Communication in Multi-agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.10158/) (2022)
- [AdvBDGen: Adversarially Fortified Prompt-Specific Fuzzy Backdoor Generator Against LLM Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.11283/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [MemLineage: Lineage-Guided Enforcement for LLM Agent Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14421/) (2026)
- [Tracing Target Answers in Poisoned Retrieval Corpora via Token Influence Attribution](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.25721/) (2026)
- [TriShieldRAG: 3 Rings, One Blind Spot in Layered Defenses for Retrieval-Augmented Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.23838/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to enhance large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge, reducing hallucinations and compensating for outdated information. However, recent studies have exposed a critical vulnerability in RAG pipelines corpus poisoning where adversaries inject malicious documents into the retrieval corpus to manipulate model outputs. In this work, we propose two complementary retrieval-stage defenses: RAGPart and RAGMask. Our defenses operate directly on the retriever, making them computationally lightweight and requiring no modification to the generation model. RAGPart leverages the inherent training dynamics of dense retrievers, exploiting document partitioning to mitigate the effect of poisoned points. In contrast, RAGMask identifies suspicious tokens based on significant similarity shifts under targeted token masking. Across two benchmarks, four poisoning strategies, and four state-of-the-art retrievers, our defenses consistently reduce attack success rates while preserving utility under benign conditions. We further introduce an interpretable attack to stress-test our defenses. Our findings highlight the potential and limitations of retrieval-stage defenses, providing practical insights for robust RAG deployments.