# IntentMiner: Intent Inversion Attack via Tool Call Analysis in the Model Context Protocol

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.14166 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.14166/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 11 of its 23 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 16 Dec 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 11 of 11)

- [BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.04805/) (2018)
- [Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.05820/) (2016)
- [Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.07805/) (2020)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [A Survey on Evaluation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.03109/) (2023)
- [MPNet: Masked and Permuted Pre-training for Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.09297/) (2020)
- [Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1609.02943/) (2016)
- [Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05499/) (2023)
- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- [Text Embeddings Reveal (Almost) As Much As Text](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06816/) (2023)
- [MCPTox: A Benchmark for Tool Poisoning Attack on Real-World MCP Servers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.14925/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Model Context Protocol Threat Modeling and Analyzing Vulnerabilities to Prompt Injection with Tool Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.22489/) (2026)
- [TrustedARI: Towards Trust-Native Agentic Routing Infrastructure for Agentic AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.15822/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Agentic AI has established the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as the standard for connecting reasoning engines with external tools. Although this decoupled architecture fosters modularity, it simultaneously shatters the traditional trust boundary. We uncover a novel privacy vector inherent to this paradigm: the Intent Inversion Attack. We show that semi-honest third-party MCP servers can accurately reconstruct users' underlying intents by leveraging only authorized metadata (e.g., function signatures, arguments, and receipts), effectively bypassing the need for raw query access. To quantify this threat, we introduce IntentMiner. Unlike statistical approaches, IntentMiner employs a hierarchical semantic parsing strategy that performs step-level intent reconstruction by analyzing tool functions, parameter entities, and result feedback in an orthogonal manner. Experiments on the ToolACE benchmark reveal that IntentMiner achieves a semantic alignment of over 85% with original queries, substantially surpassing LLM baselines. This work exposes a critical endogenous vulnerability: without semantic obfuscation, executing functions requires the transparency of intent, thereby challenging the privacy foundations of next-generation AI agents.