# Proactive Defense: Compound AI for Detecting Persuasion Attacks and Measuring Inoculation Effectiveness

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.21749 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.21749/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 8 of its 41 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 23 Nov 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.04805/) (2018)
- [On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.07258/) (2021)
- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [DAGs with NO TEARS: Continuous Optimization for Structure Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.01422/) (2018)
- [SOTOPIA: Interactive Evaluation for Social Intelligence in Language Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.11667/) (2023)
- [Generative Language Models and Automated Influence Operations: Emerging Threats and Potential Mitigations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.04246/) (2023)
- [Think Fast, Think Slow, Think Critical: Designing an Automated Propaganda Detection Tool](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.19135/) (2024)
- [Identifying and Understanding User Reactions to Deceptive and Trusted Social News Sources](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.12032/) (2018)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This paper introduces BRIES, a novel compound AI architecture designed to detect and measure the effectiveness of persuasion attacks across information environments. We present a system with specialized agents: a Twister that generates adversarial content employing targeted persuasion tactics, a Detector that identifies attack types with configurable parameters, a Defender that creates resilient content through content inoculation, and an Assessor that employs causal inference to evaluate inoculation effectiveness. Experimenting with the SemEval 2023 Task 3 taxonomy across the synthetic persuasion dataset, we demonstrate significant variations in detection performance across language agents. Our comparative analysis reveals significant performance disparities with GPT-4 achieving superior detection accuracy on complex persuasion techniques, while open-source models like Llama3 and Mistral demonstrated notable weaknesses in identifying subtle rhetorical, suggesting that different architectures encode and process persuasive language patterns in fundamentally different ways. We show that prompt engineering dramatically affects detection efficacy, with temperature settings and confidence scoring producing model-specific variations; Gemma and GPT-4 perform optimally at lower temperatures while Llama3 and Mistral show improved capabilities at higher temperatures. Our causal analysis provides novel insights into socio-emotional-cognitive signatures of persuasion attacks, revealing that different attack types target specific cognitive dimensions. This research advances generative AI safety and cognitive security by quantifying LLM-specific vulnerabilities to persuasion attacks and delivers a framework for enhancing human cognitive resilience through structured interventions before exposure to harmful content.