# Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.12710 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.12710/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 57 of its 82 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 16 Nov 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 57)

- [LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.13971/) (2023)
- [GPT-4o System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21276/) (2024)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.07858/) (2022)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [DeepSeek LLM: Scaling Open-Source Language Models with Longtermism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.02954/) (2024)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01318/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.13860/) (2023)
- [SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03684/) (2023)
- [Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01833/) (2024)
- [A Holistic Approach to Undesired Content Detection in the Real World](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.03274/) (2022)
- [Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.04313/) (2024)
- [Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.16339/) (2024)
- [SALAD-Bench: A Hierarchical and Comprehensive Safety Benchmark for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.05044/) (2024)
- [WildTeaming at Scale: From In-the-Wild Jailbreaks to (Adversarially) Safer Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18510/) (2024)
- [Rainbow Teaming: Open-Ended Generation of Diverse Adversarial Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.16822/) (2024)
- [AutoDAN-Turbo: A Lifelong Agent for Strategy Self-Exploration to Jailbreak LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.05295/) (2024)
- [A New Generation of Perspective API: Efficient Multilingual Character-level Transformers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.11176/) (2022)
- [Sociotechnical Safety Evaluation of Generative AI Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.11986/) (2023)
- [Robust Prompt Optimization for Defending Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.17263/) (2024)
- [LLM Defenses Are Not Robust to Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks Yet](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.15221/) (2024)
- [Open Sesame! Universal Black Box Jailbreaking of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.01446/) (2023)
- [Simulating Classroom Education with LLM-Empowered Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.19226/) (2024)
- [Memento: Fine-tuning LLM Agents without Fine-tuning LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.16153/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [OpenRT: An Open-Source Red Teaming Framework for Multimodal LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.01592/) (2026)
- [AgenticRed: Evolving Agentic Systems for Red-Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.13518/) (2026)
- [SentGuard: Sentence-Level Streaming Guardrails for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.02041/) (2026)
- [AJAR: Adaptive Jailbreak Architecture for Red-teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.10971/) (2026)
- [CONTRA: Red-Teaming Configurations of Personalizable Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.03220/) (2026)
- [TAME: Test-Time Adversarial Prompt Tuning via Mixture-of-Experts for Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.17577/) (2026)
- [Automatic Hard Example Synthesis with Multi-Level Agentic Data Curation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.14256/) (2026)
- [OpenART: Scaling Agent Red Teaming via Open-Ended Environment Evolution](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.00677/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Automated red teaming frameworks for Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, yet many still formulate attack optimization primarily in the prompt space. In other words, these methods mainly search for better attack wording or better strategy choices, but they do not search over executable code. By moving the search into code space, we can optimize not only the final attack prompt, but also the procedure that generates it, including execution flow, reusable logic, branching, and failure-driven repair. To overcome this gap, we introduce EvoSynth, an autonomous multi-agent framework that shifts the optimization space from prompts to executable code. Instead of refining prompts directly, EvoSynth employs a multi-agent system to autonomously engineer, evolve, and execute code-based attack algorithms. Crucially, it features a code-level self-correction loop, allowing it to iteratively rewrite the code-based algorithm in response to target-model feedback and failed attempts. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that EvoSynth achieves an 85.5% Attack Success Rate (ASR) against highly robust models like Claude-Sonnet-4.5 and a 95.9% average ASR across evaluated targets, while generating attacks that are significantly more diverse than those from existing methods. We release our framework to facilitate future research on evolutionary synthesis in executable code space.