# Output Supervision Can Obfuscate the Chain of Thought

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.11584 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.11584/

## Key facts

- Cited by 13 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning.
- Builds on 10 of its 43 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 11 Oct 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM reasoning / [Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/lr/prompting-and-chain-of-thought-reasoning/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.11903/) (2022)
- [Qwen3 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09388/) (2025)
- [Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.03300/) (2020)
- [DeepSeek-R1: Incentivizing Reasoning Capability in LLMs via Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.12948/) (2025)
- [Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.05410/) (2025)
- [Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.11926/) (2025)
- [Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.11473/) (2025)
- [REASONING GYM: Reasoning Environments for Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.24760/) (2025)
- [When Chain of Thought is Necessary, Language Models Struggle to Evade Monitors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.05246/) (2025)
- [Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.10462/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.05706/) (2026)
- [Chain-of-thought obfuscation learned from output supervision can generalise to unseen tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.23086/) (2026)
- [Consistency Training while Mitigating Obfuscation via Rate Matching](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.02211/) (2026)
- [Multi-Stream LLMs: Unblocking Language Models with Parallel Streams of Thoughts, Inputs and Outputs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.12460/) (2026)
- [Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.15257/) (2026)
- [Monitoring and Discovering Reward Hacking with Internal Representations during LLM Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.19101/) (2026)
- [Why Safety Probes Catch Liars But Miss Fanatics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.25861/) (2026)
- [HarmThoughts: A Benchmark for Fine-Grained Harmful Behavior Detection in Reasoning Traces](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.19001/) (2026)
- [A transformer architecture alteration to incentivise externalised reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.21376/) (2026)
- [Tandem Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.28166/) (2026)
- [On the Generalization of Steering Vectors for Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.29062/) (2026)
- [Taming CoT Obfuscation in VLMs: From Mechanistic Evidence to Activation Enforcement](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.24243/) (2026)
- [Monitorability Disposition in Large Reasoning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.04914/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

OpenAI (2025) showed that training against a chain of thought (CoT) monitor can cause obfuscated CoTs, which contain bad behavior the monitor cannot detect. They proposed to keep CoTs monitorable by training only against output monitors that do not have access to CoT. We show that such training can still cause obfuscated CoTs via two mechanisms. First, when a model is trained to produce a safe-looking output, that model may generalize to making its CoTs look safe. Second, since later tokens are conditioned on earlier ones, safe-looking CoTs may increase the likelihood of safe outputs, causing safe-looking CoTs to be reinforced. We introduce two mitigations to address these two issues, which achieve a Pareto improvement in terms of monitorability and task performance compared to regular training.
