# Can LLM Infer Risk Information From MCP Server System Logs?

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.05867 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.05867/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 21 of its 95 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 8 Nov 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 21 of 21)

- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.03300/) (2024)
- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16789/) (2023)
- [Megatron-LM: Training Multi-Billion Parameter Language Models Using Model Parallelism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.08053/) (2019)
- [Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15334/) (2023)
- [SGLang: Efficient Execution of Structured Language Model Programs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.07104/) (2023)
- [API-Bank: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Tool-Augmented LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.08244/) (2023)
- [ToolAlpaca: Generalized Tool Learning for Language Models with 3000 Simulated Cases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05301/) (2023)
- [Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.14470/) (2024)
- [MCP-Bench: Benchmarking Tool-Using LLM Agents with Complex Real-World Tasks via MCP Servers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.20453/) (2025)
- [MCP-Universe: Benchmarking Large Language Models with Real-World Model Context Protocol Servers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.14704/) (2025)
- [MCPSecBench: A Systematic Security Benchmark and Playground for Testing Model Context Protocols](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.13220/) (2025)
- [MCP-RADAR: A Multi-Dimensional Benchmark for Evaluating Tool Use Capabilities in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.16700/) (2025)
- [MCPMark: A Benchmark for Stress-Testing Realistic and Comprehensive MCP Use](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.24002/) (2025)
- [MCPEval: Automatic MCP-based Deep Evaluation for AI Agent Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.12806/) (2025)
- [MCIP: Protecting MCP Safety via Model Contextual Integrity Protocol](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.14590/) (2025)
- [MCP-AgentBench: Evaluating Real-World Language Agent Performance with MCP-Mediated Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.09734/) (2025)
- [Building a Foundational Guardrail for General Agentic Systems via Synthetic Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.09781/) (2025)
- [We Should Identify and Mitigate Third-Party Safety Risks in MCP-Powered Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.13666/) (2025)
- [Beyond the Protocol: Unveiling Attack Vectors in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Ecosystem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.02040/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Understanding How Enterprises Adopt the Model Context Protocol for LLM-Driven Software Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.09182/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate strong capabilities in solving complex tasks when integrated with external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a standard interface for enabling such tool-based interactions. However, these interactions introduce substantial security concerns, particularly when the MCP server is compromised or untrustworthy. While prior benchmarks primarily focus on prompt injection attacks or analyze the vulnerabilities of LLM-MCP interaction trajectories, limited attention has been given to the underlying system logs associated with malicious MCP servers. To address this gap, we present the first synthetic benchmark for evaluating LLMs' ability to identify security risks from system logs. We define nine categories of MCP server risks and generate 1,800 synthetic system logs using ten state-of-the-art LLMs. These logs are embedded in the return values of 243 curated MCP servers, yielding a dataset of 2,421 chat histories for training and 471 queries for evaluation. Our pilot experiments reveal that smaller models often fail to detect risky system logs, leading to high false negatives. While models trained with supervised fine-tuning (SFT) tend to over-flag benign logs, resulting in elevated false positives, Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward (RLVR) offers a better precision-recall balance. In particular, after training with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), Llama3.1-8B-Instruct achieves 83 percent accuracy, surpassing the best-performing large remote model by 9 percentage points. Fine-grained, per-category analysis further underscores the effectiveness of reinforcement learning in enhancing LLM safety within the MCP framework. Code and data are available at https://github.com/PorUna-byte/MCP-RiskCue.