# QueryIPI: Query-agnostic Indirect Prompt Injection on Coding Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.23675 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.23675/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 20 of its 38 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 27 Oct 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 20 of 20)

- [Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contexts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.03172/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- [AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12784/) (2024)
- [Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlighting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.14720/) (2024)
- [LooGLE: Can Long-Context Language Models Understand Long Contexts?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.04939/) (2023)
- [Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.19793/) (2025)
- [AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.13352/) (2024)
- [Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.00061/) (2025)
- [MCPTox: A Benchmark for Tool Poisoning Attack on Real-World MCP Servers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.14925/) (2025)
- [AdvAgent: Controllable Blackbox Red-teaming on Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.17401/) (2024)
- [AgentVigil: Generic Black-Box Red-teaming for Indirect Prompt Injection against LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.05849/) (2025)
- [Defense Against Prompt Injection Attack by Leveraging Attack Techniques](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.00459/) (2024)
- [MCP-Zero: Active Tool Discovery for Autonomous LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.01056/) (2025)
- [Prompt Leakage effect and defense strategies for multi-turn LLM interactions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16251/) (2024)
- [A First Look at the Security Issues in the Model Context Protocol Ecosystem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.16558/) (2025)
- [You Can't Steal Nothing: Mitigating Prompt Leakages in LLMs via System Vectors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.21884/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10749/) (2026)
- [Beyond the Payload: How User Invocation Shapes Coding Agent Vulnerability to Repository Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.30686/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Modern coding agents integrated into IDEs orchestrate powerful tools and high-privilege system access, creating a high-stakes attack surface. Prior work on Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) is mainly query-specific, requiring particular user queries as triggers and leading to poor generalizability. We propose query-agnostic IPI, a new attack paradigm that reliably executes malicious payloads under arbitrary user queries. Our key insight is that malicious payloads should leverage the invariant prompt context (i.e., system prompt and tool descriptions) rather than variant user queries. We present QueryIPI, an automated framework that uses tool descriptions as optimizable payloads and refines them via iterative, prompt-based blackbox optimization. QueryIPI leverages system invariants for initial seed generation aligned with agent conventions, and iterative reflection to resolve instruction-following failures and safety refusals. Experiments on five simulated agents show that QueryIPI achieves up to 87% success rate, outperforming the best baseline (50%). Crucially, generated malicious descriptions transfer to real-world coding agents, highlighting a practical security risk.