# Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.19298 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.19298/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 4 of its 19 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Oct 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- ["Other-Play" for Zero-Shot Coordination](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.02979/) (2020)
- [The Hanabi Challenge: A New Frontier for AI Research](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.00506/) (2019)
- [Simplicial Models for the Epistemic Logic of Faulty Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.01351/) (2023)
- [Synergistic Knowledge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.18646/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies. We illustrate the effect of higher-order knowledge of strategies by studying the game Hanabi. Further, we show that common knowledge of strategies is necessary to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we study the decidability of the model checking problem.
