# Position: LLM Watermarking Should Align Stakeholders' Incentives for Practical Adoption

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.18333 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.18333/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Watermarking generated content and models, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 89 of its 118 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 21 Oct 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Watermarking generated content and models](https://mlsanity.com/safety/watermarking-generated-content-and-models/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 89)

- [Language Models are Few-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14165/) (2020)
- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.11401/) (2020)
- [Qwen2.5 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.15115/) (2024)
- [Dense Passage Retrieval for Open-Domain Question Answering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.04906/) (2020)
- [Instruction-Following Evaluation for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07911/) (2023)
- [Chatbot Arena: An Open Platform for Evaluating LLMs by Human Preference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.04132/) (2024)
- [Approximate Nearest Neighbor Negative Contrastive Learning for Dense Text Retrieval](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.00808/) (2020)
- [A Watermark for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.10226/) (2023)
- [AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12784/) (2024)
- [Robust Distortion-free Watermarks for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15593/) (2023)
- [Provable Robust Watermarking for AI-Generated Text](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.17439/) (2023)
- [PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07867/) (2024)
- [Undetectable Watermarks for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.09194/) (2023)
- [GPT detectors are biased against non-native English writers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.02819/) (2023)
- [Who Wrote this Code? Watermarking for Code Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15060/) (2023)
- [A Note on Shumailov et al. (2024): `AI Models Collapse When Trained on Recursively Generated Data'](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.12954/) (2024)
- [A Semantic Invariant Robust Watermark for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06356/) (2023)
- [A Survey of Text Watermarking in the Era of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.07913/) (2023)
- [Unbiased Watermark for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10669/) (2023)
- [Instructions as Backdoors: Backdoor Vulnerabilities of Instruction Tuning for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.14710/) (2023)
- [MarkLLM: An Open-Source Toolkit for LLM Watermarking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.10051/) (2024)
- [Watermark Stealing in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.19361/) (2024)
- [Protecting Language Generation Models via Invisible Watermarking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.03162/) (2023)
- [On the Possibilities of AI-Generated Text Detection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.04736/) (2023)
- [Watermarks in the Sand: Impossibility of Strong Watermarking for Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.04378/) (2023)
- [Three Bricks to Consolidate Watermarks for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.00113/) (2023)
- [Robust Multi-bit Natural Language Watermarking through Invariant Features](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.01904/) (2023)
- [A Robust Semantics-based Watermark for Large Language Model against Paraphrasing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.08721/) (2023)
- [On the Learnability of Watermarks for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.04469/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Tool Use Enables Undetectable Steganography in Multi-Agent LLM Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.28425/) (2026)
- [Watermarking Should Be Treated as a Monitoring Primitive](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.13095/) (2026)
- [TokenPure: Watermark Removal through Tokenized Appearance and Structural Guidance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.01314/) (2025)
- [LLM Watermarking as Big Data Provenance: A Deployment-Oriented Systematization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.10103/) (2026)
- [Fighting Fire with Fire: On the Feasibility of Protecting Exercises Against AI Cheating](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.01112/) (2026)
- [Learning to Follow In-Context Watermark Instructions via Self-Distillation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.29030/) (2026)
- [SemTrace: Source-Grounded Semantic Signatures for Tracing LLM Exposure to Protected Documents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.29575/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Despite progress in watermarking algorithms for large language models (LLMs), real-world deployment remains limited. We argue that this gap stems from misaligned incentives among LLM providers, platforms, and end users, which manifest as three key barriers: competitive risk, detection-tool governance, and attribution issues. We revisit three classes of watermarking through this lens. Model watermarking naturally aligns with LLM provider interests, yet faces new challenges in open-source ecosystems. LLM text watermarking offers modest provider benefit when framed solely as an anti-misuse tool, but can gain traction in narrowly scoped settings such as dataset de-contamination or user-controlled provenance. In-context watermarking (ICW) is tailored for trusted parties, such as conference organizers or educators, who embed hidden watermarking instructions into documents. If a dishonest reviewer or student submits this text to an LLM, the output carries a detectable watermark indicating misuse. This setup aligns incentives: users experience no quality loss, trusted parties gain a detection tool, and LLM providers remain neutral by simply following watermark instructions. We advocate for a broader exploration of incentive-aligned methods, with ICW as an example, in domains where trusted parties need reliable tools to detect misuse. More broadly, we distill design principles for incentive-aligned, domain-specific watermarking and outline future research directions. Our position is that the practical adoption of LLM watermarking requires aligning stakeholder incentives in targeted application domains and fostering active community engagement.
