# AgentTypo: Adaptive Typographic Prompt Injection Attacks against Black-box Multimodal Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04257 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.04257/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models.
- Builds on 63 of its 70 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 5 Oct 2025.

## Placed in

- Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models / [MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness](https://mlsanity.com/mllm/mllm-jailbreaks-and-adversarial-robustness/)
- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Vision-language and text-to-image safety](https://mlsanity.com/safety/vision-language-and-text-to-image-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 63)

- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [GPT-4 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08774/) (2023)
- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.11903/) (2022)
- [The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Deep Features as a Perceptual Metric](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1801.03924/) (2018)
- [Visual Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.08485/) (2023)
- [Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05530/) (2024)
- [Tree of Thoughts: Deliberate Problem Solving with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.10601/) (2023)
- [Mistral 7B](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06825/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Scaling Instruction-Finetuned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.11416/) (2022)
- [WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.13854/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [WebShop: Towards Scalable Real-World Web Interaction with Grounded Language Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.01206/) (2022)
- [A Comprehensive Survey of Continual Learning: Theory, Method and Application](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.00487/) (2023)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [The Flan Collection: Designing Data and Methods for Effective Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.13688/) (2023)
- [Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.02119/) (2023)
- [NExT-GPT: Any-to-Any Multimodal LLM](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.05519/) (2023)
- [Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05499/) (2023)
- [GPT-4V(ision) is a Generalist Web Agent, if Grounded](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.01614/) (2024)
- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- ["Do Anything Now": Characterizing and Evaluating In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts on Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03825/) (2023)
- [WebVoyager: Building an End-to-End Web Agent with Large Multimodal Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.13919/) (2024)
- [Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.14132/) (2023)
- [FigStep: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Typographic Visual Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05608/) (2023)
- [Language Models can Solve Computer Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.17491/) (2023)
- [Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.12815/) (2023)
- [On Evaluating Adversarial Robustness of Large Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16934/) (2023)
- [MM-LLMs: Recent Advances in MultiModal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.13601/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [ARGUS: Defending Against Multimodal Indirect Prompt Injection via Steering Instruction-Following Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.05745/) (2025)
- [Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10749/) (2026)
- [A Cross-Modal Prompt Injection Attack against Large Vision-Language Models with Image-Only Perturbation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.16090/) (2026)
- [Render Before Reading: Visual Rendering as a Prompt Injection Defense](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.36121/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Multimodal agents built on large vision-language models (LVLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-world settings but remain highly vulnerable to prompt injection, especially through visual inputs. We introduce AgentTypo, a black-box red-teaming framework that mounts adaptive typographic prompt injection by embedding optimized text into webpage images. Our automatic typographic prompt injection (ATPI) algorithm maximizes prompt reconstruction by substituting captioners while minimizing human detectability via a stealth loss, with a Tree-structured Parzen Estimator guiding black-box optimization over text placement, size, and color. To further enhance attack strength, we develop AgentTypo-pro, a multi-LLM system that iteratively refines injection prompts using evaluation feedback and retrieves successful past examples for continual learning. Effective prompts are abstracted into generalizable strategies and stored in a strategy repository, enabling progressive knowledge accumulation and reuse in future attacks. Experiments on the VWA-Adv benchmark across Classifieds, Shopping, and Reddit scenarios show that AgentTypo significantly outperforms the latest image-based attacks such as AgentAttack. On GPT-4o agents, our image-only attack raises the success rate from 0.23 to 0.45, with consistent results across GPT-4V, GPT-4o-mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Claude 3 Opus. In image+text settings, AgentTypo achieves 0.68 ASR, also outperforming the latest baselines. Our findings reveal that AgentTypo poses a practical and potent threat to multimodal agents and highlight the urgent need for effective defense.