# Breaking the Code: Security Assessment of AI Code Agents Through Systematic Jailbreaking Attacks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.01359 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.01359/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 25 of its 39 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 1 Oct 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 25 of 25)

- [Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Code](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.03374/) (2021)
- [Program Synthesis with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2108.07732/) (2021)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Competition-Level Code Generation with AlphaCode](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.07814/) (2022)
- [OpenHands: An Open Platform for AI Software Developers as Generalist Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.16741/) (2024)
- [Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09527/) (2022)
- [StarCoder: may the source be with you!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.06161/) (2023)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- [JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01318/) (2024)
- [InCoder: A Generative Model for Code Infilling and Synthesis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05999/) (2022)
- [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09024/) (2024)
- [CodeT: Code Generation with Generated Tests](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.10397/) (2022)
- [Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02644/) (2024)
- [DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.03191/) (2023)
- [A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easily](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.08268/) (2023)
- [Automatically Auditing Large Language Models via Discrete Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.04381/) (2023)
- [COLD-Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs with Stealthiness and Controllability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08679/) (2024)
- [Agent Smith: A Single Image Can Jailbreak One Million Multimodal LLM Agents Exponentially Fast](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08567/) (2024)
- [RedCode: Risky Code Execution and Generation Benchmark for Code Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.07781/) (2024)
- [Fast Adversarial Attacks on Language Models In One GPU Minute](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.15570/) (2024)
- [CodeAttack: Revealing Safety Generalization Challenges of Large Language Models via Code Completion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.07865/) (2024)
- [RMCBench: Benchmarking Large Language Models' Resistance to Malicious Code](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.15154/) (2024)
- [Security Attacks on LLM-based Code Completion Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.11006/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [A Survey on Agentic Security: Applications, Threats and Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.06445/) (2025)
- [Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14859/) (2026)
- [LITMUS: Benchmarking Behavioral Jailbreaks of LLM Agents in Real OS Environments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.10779/) (2026)
- [REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.10669/) (2026)
- [MOSAIC-Bench: Measuring Compositional Vulnerability Induction in Coding Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.03952/) (2026)
- [Refusal Evaluation in Coding LLMs and Code Agents: A Systematic Review of Thirteen Malicious-Code Prompt Corpora (2023-2025)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.20351/) (2026)
- [Refused in Chat, Written in Code: Workflow-Level Jailbreak Construction in IDE Coding Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.03968/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Code-capable large language model (LLM) agents are embedded in software engineering workflows where they can read, write, and execute code, raising "jailbreak" stakes beyond text-only settings. Prior evaluations emphasize refusal or harmful-text detection, leaving open whether agents compile and run malicious programs. We present JAWS-Bench (Jailbreaks Across WorkSpaces), a benchmark spanning three escalating workspace regimes mirroring attacker capability: empty (JAWS-0), single-file (JAWS-1), and multi-file (JAWS-M). We pair it with a hierarchical, executable-aware Judge Framework that tests (i) compliance, (ii) attack success, (iii) syntactic correctness, and (iv) runtime executability to measure deployable harm. Across seven LLM backends from five families, prompt-only attacks in JAWS-0 achieve 61% compliance; 58% are harmful, 52% parse, and 27% run end-to-end. In JAWS-1, compliance reaches ~100% for stronger models with a mean ASR (Attack Success Rate) ~71%; JAWS-M raises mean ASR to ~75%, with 32% runnable attack code. Wrapping an LLM in an agent increases ASR by 1.6×, by overturning initial refusals during planning and tool use. Additional evaluations with SWE-Agent and OpenAI Codex exhibit similar trends, indicating that JAWS-Bench can be reused across multiple agent frameworks. Category analyses identify which attack classes are most vulnerable and deployable, motivating execution-aware defenses and refusal-preserving agent designs.