# VISOR++: Universal Visual Inputs based Steering for Large Vision Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.25533 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.25533/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Embodied and 3D vision-language models, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models.
- Builds on 25 of its 31 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 Sep 2025.

## Placed in

- Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models / [Embodied and 3D vision-language models](https://mlsanity.com/mllm/embodied-and-3d-vision-language-models/)
- Mechanistic interpretability / [Steering and probing for LLM safety](https://mlsanity.com/mechinterp/steering-and-probing-for-llm-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 25 of 25)

- [GPT-4 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08774/) (2023)
- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.09288/) (2023)
- [Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.03300/) (2020)
- [Qwen Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.16609/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06681/) (2023)
- [LLaVA-NeXT-Interleave: Tackling Multi-image, Video, and 3D in Large Multimodal Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.07895/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.13860/) (2023)
- [Visual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.13213/) (2023)
- [What matters when building vision-language models?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.02246/) (2024)
- [On Evaluating Adversarial Robustness of Large Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16934/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.14539/) (2023)
- [AxBench: Steering LLMs? Even Simple Baselines Outperform Sparse Autoencoders](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.17148/) (2025)
- [How Robust is Google's Bard to Adversarial Image Attacks?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.11751/) (2023)
- [Image Hijacks: Adversarial Images can Control Generative Models at Runtime](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.00236/) (2023)
- [Analyzing the Generalization and Reliability of Steering Vectors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12404/) (2024)
- [Personalized Steering of Large Language Models: Versatile Steering Vectors Through Bi-directional Preference Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.00045/) (2024)
- [Rethinking Model Ensemble in Transfer-based Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.09105/) (2023)
- [Style Vectors for Steering Generative Large Language Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.01618/) (2024)
- [Steering Away from Harm: An Adaptive Approach to Defending Vision Language Model Against Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.16721/) (2024)
- [Failures to Find Transferable Image Jailbreaks Between Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.15211/) (2024)
- [Controlling Large Language Models Through Concept Activation Vectors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.05764/) (2025)
- [X-Transfer Attacks: Towards Super Transferable Adversarial Attacks on CLIP](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.05528/) (2025)
- [Textual Steering Vectors Can Improve Visual Understanding in Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.14071/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Adversarial Confusion Attack: Disrupting Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.20494/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

As Vision Language Models (VLMs) are deployed across safety-critical applications, understanding and controlling their behavioral patterns has become increasingly important. Existing behavioral control methods face significant limitations: system prompting approaches could easily be overridden by user instructions, while applying activation-based steering vectors requires invasive runtime access to model internals, precluding deployment with API-based services and closed-source models. Finding steering methods that transfer across multiple VLMs is still an open area of research. To this end, we introduce universal visual input based steering for output redirection (VISOR++), to achieve behavioral control through optimized visual inputs alone. We demonstrate that a single VISOR++ image can be generated for an ensemble of VLMs to emulate each of their steering vectors. By crafting universal visual inputs that induce target activation patterns, VISOR++ eliminates the need for runtime model access while remaining deployment-agnostic. This means that when an underlying model supports multimodal capability, model behaviors can be steered by inserting an image input replacing runtime steering vector based interventions. We first demonstrate the effectiveness of the VISOR++ images on open-access models such as LLaVA-1.5-7B and IDEFICS2-8B along three alignment directions: refusal, sycophancy and survival instinct. Both the model-specific steering images and the jointly optimized images achieve performance parity closely following that of steering vectors for both positive and negative steering tasks. We also show the promise of VISOR++ images in achieving directional behavioral shifts for unseen models including both open-access and closed-access ones. Furthermore, VISOR++ images are able to preserve 99.9% performance on 14,000 unrelated MMLU evaluation tasks.