# Threat Modeling for Enhancing Security of IoT Audio Classification Devices under a Secure Protocols Framework

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.14657 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.14657/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 3 of its 33 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 18 Sep 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Holistic Adversarial Robustness of Deep Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.07201/) (2022)
- [Realtime Facial Expression Recognition: Neuromorphic Hardware vs. Edge AI Accelerators](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.08792/) (2024)
- [P2NIA: Privacy-Preserving Non-Iterative Auditing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.00874/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The rapid proliferation of IoT nodes equipped with microphones and capable of performing on-device audio classification exposes highly sensitive data while operating under tight resource constraints. To protect against this, we present a defence-in-depth architecture comprising a security protocol that treats the edge device, cellular network and cloud backend as three separate trust domains, linked by TPM-based remote attestation and mutually authenticated TLS 1.3. A STRIDE-driven threat model and attack-tree analysis guide the design. At startup, each boot stage is measured into TPM PCRs. The node can only decrypt its LUKS-sealed partitions after the cloud has verified a TPM quote and released a one-time unlock key. This ensures that rogue or tampered devices remain inert. Data in transit is protected by TLS 1.3 and hybridised with Kyber and Dilithium to provide post-quantum resilience. Meanwhile, end-to-end encryption and integrity hashes safeguard extracted audio features. Signed, rollback-protected AI models and tamper-responsive sensors harden firmware and hardware. Data at rest follows a 3-2-1 strategy comprising a solid-state drive sealed with LUKS, an offline cold archive encrypted with a hybrid post-quantum cipher and an encrypted cloud replica. Finally, we set out a plan for evaluating the physical and logical security of the proposed protocol.