# Selecting Interlacing Committees

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.02519 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.02519/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 2 Sep 2025.

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.05953/) (2026)
- [Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.03067/) (2026)
- [Algorithms for Structured Elections under Thiele Voting Rules](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.28575/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Polarization is a major concern for a well-functioning society. Often, mass polarization of a society is driven by polarizing political representation, even when the latter is easily preventable. The existing computational social choice methods for the task of committee selection are not designed to address this issue. We enrich the standard approach to committee selection by defining two quantitative measures that evaluate how well a given committee interconnects the voters. Maximizing these measures aims at avoiding polarizing committees. While the corresponding maximization problems are NP-complete in general, we obtain efficient algorithms for profiles in the voter-candidate interval domain. Moreover, we analyze the compatibility of our goals with other representation objectives, such as excellence, diversity, and proportionality. We identify trade-offs between approximation guarantees, and describe algorithms that achieve simultaneous constant-factor approximations.