# AI Propaganda factories with language models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.20186 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.20186/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 19 of its 36 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 27 Aug 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 19 of 19)

- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Trustworthy LLMs: a Survey and Guideline for Evaluating Large Language Models' Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.05374/) (2023)
- [Small Language Models are the Future of Agentic AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.02153/) (2025)
- [LLMs instead of Human Judges? A Large Scale Empirical Study across 20 NLP Evaluation Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18403/) (2024)
- [The Effect of Sampling Temperature on Problem Solving in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.05201/) (2024)
- [Quantifying the Persona Effect in LLM Simulations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.10811/) (2024)
- [Generative Language Models and Automated Influence Operations: Emerging Threats and Potential Mitigations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.04246/) (2023)
- [A Survey of Context Engineering for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.13334/) (2025)
- [PersonaGym: Evaluating Persona Agents and LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.18416/) (2024)
- [Systematic Evaluation of LLM-as-a-Judge in LLM Alignment Tasks: Explainable Metrics and Diverse Prompt Templates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.13006/) (2024)
- [How Well Do LLMs Represent Values Across Cultures? Empirical Analysis of LLM Responses Based on Hofstede Cultural Dimensions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.14805/) (2024)
- [What is the Role of Small Models in the LLM Era: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.06857/) (2024)
- [A Survey of Small Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.20011/) (2024)
- [How malicious AI swarms can threaten democracy: The fusion of agentic AI and LLMs marks a new frontier in information warfare](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.06299/) (2025)
- [The Levers of Political Persuasion with Conversational AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.13919/) (2025)
- [Stick to your Role! Stability of Personal Values Expressed in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.14846/) (2024)
- [Large language models can consistently generate high-quality content for election disinformation operations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.06731/) (2024)
- [Measurement in the Age of LLMs: An Application to Ideological Scaling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.09203/) (2023)
- [LLMs Among Us: Generative AI Participating in Digital Discourse](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07940/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Emergent Coordinated Behaviors in Networked LLM Agents: Modeling the Strategic Dynamics of Information Operations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.25003/) (2025)
- [An Agentic Operationalization of DISARM for FIMI Investigation on Social Media](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.15109/) (2026)
- [How Far Will They Go? Red-Teaming Online Influence with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.22880/) (2026)
- [IO Factory: Simulating AI-Enabled Influence Campaigns at Scale](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.10920/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

AI-powered influence operations can now be executed end-to-end on commodity hardware. We show that small language models produce coherent, persona-driven political messaging and can be evaluated automatically without human raters. Two behavioural findings emerge. First, persona-over-model: persona design explains behaviour more than model identity. Second, engagement as a stressor: when replies must counter-arguments, ideological adherence strengthens and the prevalence of extreme content increases. We demonstrate that fully automated influence-content production is within reach of both large and small actors. Consequently, defence should shift from restricting model access towards conversation-centric detection and disruption of campaigns and coordination infrastructure. Paradoxically, the very consistency that enables these operations also provides a detection signature.
