# Benchmarking the Robustness of Agentic Systems to Adversarially-Induced Harms

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.16481 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.16481/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 3 of its 46 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Aug 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Improving Factuality and Reasoning in Language Models through Multiagent Debate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.14325/) (2023)
- [Reinforcement Learning for Long-Horizon Interactive LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.01600/) (2025)
- [AgentSafe: Safeguarding Large Language Model-based Multi-agent Systems via Hierarchical Data Management](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.04392/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Can AI Perceive Physical Danger and Intervene?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.21651/) (2025)
- [A Systematic Survey of Security Threats and Defenses in LLM-Based AI Agents: A Layered Attack Surface Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.23338/) (2026)
- [Risky-Bench: Probing Agentic Safety Risks under Real-World Deployment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.03100/) (2026)
- [Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10749/) (2026)
- [In-Context Environments Induce Evaluation-Awareness in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.03824/) (2026)
- [Taxonomy and Consistency Analysis of Safety Benchmarks for AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.16282/) (2026)
- [MaMa: A Game-Theoretic Approach for Designing Safe Agentic Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.04431/) (2026)
- [HomeSafe-Bench: Evaluating Vision-Language Models on Unsafe Action Detection for Embodied Agents in Household Scenarios](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.11975/) (2026)
- [Position: A Three-Layer Probabilistic Assume-Guarantee Architecture Is Structurally Required for Safe LLM Agent Deployment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.18672/) (2026)
- [CONTRA: Red-Teaming Configurations of Personalizable Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.03220/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Ensuring the safe use of agentic systems requires a thorough understanding of the range of malicious behaviors these systems may exhibit. In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of LLM-based agentic systems against attacks that aim to elicit harmful actions from agents. To this end, we propose a novel taxonomy of harms for agentic systems and a novel benchmark, BAD-ACTS, for studying the security of agentic systems with respect to a wide range of harmful actions. BAD-ACTS consists of five implementations of agentic systems in distinct application environments, as well as a dataset of 238 high-quality examples of harmful actions and an extended dataset containing 699 additional adversarial actions. This enables a comprehensive study of the robustness of agentic systems across a wide range of categories of harmful behaviors, available tools, and inter-agent communication structures. Using this benchmark, we analyze the robustness of agentic systems under an array of attackers attempting to elicit malicious behaviors, including agents acting adversarially and prompt injections. We found that agents are often vulnerable, as indicated by success rates between 40% and 90% depending on the model. We additionally propose an effective defense based on zero-shot message monitoring. We believe that this benchmark provides a diverse testbed for the safety research of agentic systems. Code is available at https://github.com/JNoether/BAD-ACTS.
