# A Truthful Mechanism Design for Distributed Optimisation Algorithms in Networks with Self-interested Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.20250 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.20250/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 27 Jul 2025.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Latency-Aware Resource Allocation over Heterogeneous Networks: A Lorentz-Invariant Market Mechanism](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.03897/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously manipulating the algorithm. We prove theoretically that the proposed mechanism incentivises self-interested agents to participate and follow the provided algorithm faithfully. Additionally, the mechanism is compatible with any distributed optimisation algorithm that can calculate at least one subgradient at a given point. Finally, we present an illustrative example that shows the effectiveness of the mechanism.