# Technical Requirements for Halting Dangerous AI Activities

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.09801 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.09801/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 19 of its 38 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 Jul 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 19 of 19)

- [Model evaluation for extreme risks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15324/) (2023)
- [Tamper-Resistant Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.00761/) (2024)
- [Black-Box Access is Insufficient for Rigorous AI Audits](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.14446/) (2024)
- [Here Comes The AI Worm: Unleashing Zero-click Worms that Target GenAI-Powered Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02817/) (2024)
- [Structured access: an emerging paradigm for safe AI deployment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.05159/) (2022)
- [Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08797/) (2024)
- [Open-Sourcing Highly Capable Foundation Models: An evaluation of risks, benefits, and alternative methods for pursuing open-source objectives](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.09227/) (2023)
- [Algorithmic progress in language models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05812/) (2024)
- [Verification methods for international AI agreements](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.16074/) (2024)
- [Risk thresholds for frontier AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.14713/) (2024)
- [Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.15867/) (2025)
- [AI Behind Closed Doors: a Primer on The Governance of Internal Deployment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.12170/) (2025)
- [Superintelligence Strategy: Expert Version](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.05628/) (2025)
- [Locking Machine Learning Models into Hardware](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.20990/) (2024)
- [International Agreements on AI Safety: Review and Recommendations for a Conditional AI Safety Treaty](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.18956/) (2025)
- [Trends in AI Supercomputers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.16026/) (2025)
- [Keep the Future Human: Why and How We Should Close the Gates to AGI and Superintelligence, and What We Should Build Instead](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.09452/) (2023)
- [Intolerable Risk Threshold Recommendations for Artificial Intelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.05812/) (2025)
- [What Information Should Be Shared with Whom "Before and During Training"?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.10379/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Designing escalation criteria for international AI incident response: criteria, triggers, and thresholds](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.23183/) (2026)
- [The Closing Window: How Governments Could Lose Their Ability to Restrain Advanced AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.05173/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The rapid development of AI systems poses unprecedented risks, including loss of control, misuse, geopolitical instability, and concentration of power. To navigate these risks and avoid worst-case outcomes, governments may proactively establish the capability for a coordinated halt on dangerous AI development and deployment. In this paper, we outline key technical interventions that could allow for a coordinated halt on dangerous AI activities. We discuss how these interventions may contribute to restricting various dangerous AI activities, and show how these interventions can form the technical foundation for potential AI governance plans.