# Artificial Delegates Resolve Fairness Issues in Perpetual Voting with Partial Turnout

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.21186 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.21186/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 4 of its 23 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 26 Jun 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.14858/) (2023)
- [Representation with Incomplete Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.15608/) (2022)
- [The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.01906/) (2018)
- [Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.11104/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Social physics in the age of artificial intelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.16900/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Perpetual voting addresses fairness in sequential collective decision-making by evaluating representational equity over time. However, existing perpetual voting rules rely on full participation and complete approval information, assumptions that rarely hold in practice, where partial turnout is the norm. In this work, we study the integration of Artificial Delegates, preference-learning agents trained to represent absent voters, into perpetual voting systems. We examine how absenteeism affects fairness and representativeness under various voting methods and evaluate the extent to which Artificial Delegates can compensate for missing participation. Our findings indicate that while absenteeism significantly affects fairness, Artificial Delegates reliably mitigate these effects and enhance robustness across diverse scenarios.