# Will artificial agents pursue power by default?

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06352 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.06352/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 10 of its 32 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Jun 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [Convex optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.01946/) (2021)
- [Voyager: An Open-Ended Embodied Agent with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16291/) (2023)
- [Artificial Intelligence, Values and Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.09768/) (2020)
- [The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.00626/) (2022)
- [An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.12001/) (2023)
- [Optimal Policies Tend to Seek Power](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.01683/) (2019)
- [Is Power-Seeking AI an Existential Risk?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.13353/) (2022)
- [Power-seeking can be probable and predictive for trained agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.06528/) (2023)
- [Parametrically Retargetable Decision-Makers Tend To Seek Power](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.13477/) (2022)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Value-Conflict Diagnostics Reveal Widespread Alignment Faking in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.20995/) (2026)
- [Instrumental Choices: Measuring the Propensity of LLM Agents to Pursue Instrumental Behaviors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.06490/) (2026)
- [The Shadow Self: Intrinsic Value Misalignment in Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.17344/) (2026)
- [Individual Disempowerment through an Advice Channel: Control Loss when Influence is Endogenous](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.14795/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Researchers worried about catastrophic risks from advanced AI have argued that we should expect sufficiently capable AI agents to pursue power over humanity because power is a convergent instrumental goal, something that is useful for a wide range of final goals. Others have recently expressed skepticism of these claims. This paper aims to formalize the concepts of instrumental convergence and power-seeking in an abstract, decision-theoretic framework, and to assess the claim that power is a convergent instrumental goal. I conclude that this claim contains at least an element of truth, but might turn out to have limited predictive utility, since an agent's options cannot always be ranked in terms of power in the absence of substantive information about the agent's final goals. However, the fact of instrumental convergence is more predictive for agents who have a good shot at attaining absolute or near-absolute power.