# VPI-Bench: Visual Prompt Injection Attacks for Computer-Use Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.02456 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.02456/

## Key facts

- Cited by 45 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 41 of its 57 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 3 Jun 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 41)

- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.13854/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [WebShop: Towards Scalable Real-World Web Interaction with Grounded Language Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.01206/) (2022)
- [Mind2Web: Towards a Generalist Agent for the Web](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.06070/) (2023)
- [Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06674/) (2023)
- [HuggingGPT: Solving AI Tasks with ChatGPT and its Friends in Hugging Face](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.17580/) (2023)
- [Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09527/) (2022)
- [UI-TARS: Pioneering Automated GUI Interaction with Native Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.12326/) (2025)
- [GPT-4V(ision) is a Generalist Web Agent, if Grounded](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.01614/) (2024)
- [A Holistic Approach to Undesired Content Detection in the Real World](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.03274/) (2022)
- [AgentTuning: Enabling Generalized Agent Abilities for LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.12823/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.14539/) (2023)
- [EIA: Environmental Injection Attack on Generalist Web Agents for Privacy Leakage](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.11295/) (2024)
- [Watch Out for Your Agents! Investigating Backdoor Threats to LLM-Based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.11208/) (2024)
- [AdaShield: Safeguarding Multimodal Large Language Models from Structure-based Attack via Adaptive Shield Prompting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.09513/) (2024)
- [Dissecting Adversarial Robustness of Multimodal LM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.12814/) (2024)
- [Attacking Vision-Language Computer Agents via Pop-ups](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.02391/) (2024)
- [BadAgent: Inserting and Activating Backdoor Attacks in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.03007/) (2024)
- [Agent-FLAN: Designing Data and Methods of Effective Agent Tuning for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.12881/) (2024)
- [GuardReasoner: Towards Reasoning-based LLM Safeguards](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.18492/) (2025)
- [FlipAttack: Jailbreak LLMs via Flipping](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02832/) (2024)
- [JailbreakZoo: Survey, Landscapes, and Horizons in Jailbreaking Large Language and Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.01599/) (2024)
- [Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.14923/) (2024)
- [Multimodal Situational Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.06172/) (2024)
- [Caution for the Environment: Multimodal LLM Agents are Susceptible to Environmental Distractions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.02544/) (2024)
- [WIPI: A New Web Threat for LLM-Driven Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.16965/) (2024)
- [WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.11717/) (2025)
- [JailGuard: A Universal Detection Framework for LLM Prompt-based Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.10766/) (2023)
- [Immune: Improving Safety Against Jailbreaks in Multi-modal LLMs via Inference-Time Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.18688/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 30 of 45)

- [WAInjectBench: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detections for Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.01354/) (2025)
- [BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.20597/) (2025)
- [VIGIL: Defending LLM Agents Against Tool Stream Injection via Verify-Before-Commit](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.05755/) (2026)
- [Are Your Agents Upward Deceivers?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.04864/) (2025)
- [The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.10577/) (2026)
- [WebSentinel: Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection Attacks for Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.03792/) (2026)
- [Just Do It!? Computer-Use Agents Exhibit Blind Goal-Directedness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.01670/) (2025)
- [ARGUS: Defending Against Multimodal Indirect Prompt Injection via Steering Instruction-Following Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.05745/) (2025)
- [CORA: Conformal Risk-Controlled Agents for Safeguarded Mobile GUI Automation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.09155/) (2026)
- [Poise: Position-Aware One-Instruction Skill Injection for Silent Execution on LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.07943/) (2026)
- [Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10749/) (2026)
- [Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.02657/) (2026)
- [From Risk Classification to Action Plan Remediation: A Guardrail Feedback Driven Framework for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.05805/) (2026)
- [LeechHijack: Covert Computational Resource Exploitation in Intelligent Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.02321/) (2025)
- [MirrorGuard: Toward Secure Computer-Use Agents via Simulation-to-Real Reasoning Correction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.12822/) (2026)
- [SnapGuard: Lightweight Prompt Injection Detection for Screenshot-Based Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.25562/) (2026)
- [WARD: Adversarially Robust Defense of Web Agents Against Prompt Injections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.15030/) (2026)
- [WebAgentGuard: A Reasoning-Driven Guard Model for Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.12284/) (2026)
- [StepJack: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agent Safety Against Multi-Step Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.06477/) (2026)
- [WebTrap Park: An Automated Platform for Systematic Security Evaluation of Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.08406/) (2026)
- [Hallucination as Exploit: Evidence-Carrying Multimodal Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.19192/) (2026)
- [Are GUI Agents Focused Enough? Automated Distraction via Semantic-level UI Element Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.07831/) (2026)
- [Constraining Host-Level Abuse in Self-Hosted Computer-Use Agents via TEE-Backed Isolation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.06393/) (2026)
- [AliMark: Enhancing Robustness of Sentence-Level Watermarking Against Text Paraphrasing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.29434/) (2026)
- [Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.05233/) (2026)
- [Isolation as a First-Class Principle for LLM-Agent System Safety: Concepts, Taxonomy, Challenges and Future Directions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.12406/) (2026)
- [LoginTrap: Uncovering Task-Agnostic Phishing-Style Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks against LLM-based Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.04741/) (2026)
- [An Experimental Evaluation of Multimodal Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic AI Frameworks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.09404/) (2026)
- [Temporal UI State Inconsistency in Desktop GUI Agents: Formalizing and Defending Against TOCTOU Attacks on Computer-Use Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.18860/) (2026)
- [Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.07110/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) with full system access enable powerful task automation but pose significant security and privacy risks due to their ability to manipulate files, access user data, and execute arbitrary commands. While prior work has focused on browser-based agents and HTML-level attacks, the vulnerabilities of CUAs remain underexplored. In this paper, we investigate Visual Prompt Injection (VPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are visually embedded within rendered user interfaces, and examine their impact on both CUAs and Browser-Use Agents (BUAs). We propose VPI-Bench, a benchmark of 306 test cases across five widely used platforms, to evaluate agent robustness under VPI threats. Each test case is a variant of a web platform, designed to be interactive, deployed in a realistic environment, and containing a visually embedded malicious prompt. Our empirical study shows that current CUAs and BUAs can be deceived at rates of up to 51% and 100%, respectively, on certain platforms. The experimental results also indicate that system prompt defenses offer only limited improvements. These findings highlight the need for robust, context-aware defenses to ensure the safe deployment of multimodal AI agents in real-world environments. The code and dataset are available at: https://github.com/cua-framework/agents