# Should Decision-Makers Reveal Classifiers in Online Strategic Classification?

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.01936 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.01936/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 30 of its 45 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Jun 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 30)

- [Performative Prediction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.06673/) (2020)
- [The Social Cost of Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.08460/) (2018)
- [Strategic Classification is Causal Modeling in Disguise](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.10362/) (2019)
- [VC Classes are Adversarially Robustly Learnable, but Only Improperly](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.04217/) (2019)
- [Causal Strategic Linear Regression](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.10066/) (2020)
- [Who Leads and Who Follows in Strategic Classification?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.12529/) (2021)
- [Strategizing against No-regret Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.13861/) (2019)
- [The Strategic Perceptron](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.01710/) (2020)
- [Information Discrepancy in Strategic Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.01028/) (2021)
- [Alternative Microfoundations for Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.12705/) (2021)
- [Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanisms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.01956/) (2020)
- [Decisions, Counterfactual Explanations and Strategic Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.04333/) (2020)
- [Selling to a No-Regret Buyer](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.09176/) (2017)
- [The Disparate Equilibria of Algorithmic Decision Making when Individuals Invest Rationally](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.04123/) (2019)
- [The Role of Randomness and Noise in Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.08377/) (2020)
- [Strategizing against Learners in Bayesian Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.08562/) (2022)
- [Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.09407/) (2022)
- [On classification of strategic agents who can both game and improve](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.00124/) (2022)
- [Calibrated Stackelberg Games: Learning Optimal Commitments Against Calibrated Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.02704/) (2023)
- [Strategic Classification under Unknown Personalized Manipulation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16501/) (2023)
- [Contracting with a Learning Agent](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.16198/) (2024)
- [Learning Losses for Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.13421/) (2022)
- [Is Learning in Games Good for the Learners?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.19496/) (2023)
- [Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.04175/) (2023)
- [Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12355/) (2023)
- [Learnability Gaps of Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.19303/) (2024)
- [Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07754/) (2023)
- [Automating Data Annotation under Strategic Human Agents: Risks and Potential Solutions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.08027/) (2024)
- [Strategic Littlestone Dimension: Improved Bounds on Online Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.11619/) (2024)
- [Price of Transparency in Strategic Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.08210/) (2016)

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Conservative classifiers do consistently well with improving agents: characterizing statistical and online learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.05252/) (2025)
- [Collective dynamics of strategic classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.09340/) (2025)
- [On Randomized Algorithms in Online Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.06257/) (2026)
- [Online Learning with Improving Agents: Multiclass, Budgeted Agents and Bandit Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.17103/) (2026)
- [Ambiguous Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10137/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Strategic classification addresses a learning problem where a decision-maker implements a classifier over agents who may manipulate their features in order to receive favorable predictions. In the standard model of online strategic classification, in each round, the decision-maker implements and publicly reveals a classifier, after which agents perfectly best respond based on this knowledge. However, in practice, whether to disclose the classifier is often debated -- some decision-makers believe that hiding the classifier can prevent misclassification errors caused by manipulation. In this paper, we formally examine how limiting the agents' access to the current classifier affects the decision-maker's performance. Specifically, we consider an extended online strategic classification setting where agents lack direct knowledge about the current classifier and instead manipulate based on a weighted average of historically implemented classifiers. Our main result shows that in this setting, the decision-maker incurs (1-γ)-1 or kin times more mistakes compared to the full-knowledge setting, where kin is the maximum in-degree of the manipulation graph (representing how many distinct feature vectors can be manipulated to appear as a single one), and γ is the discount factor indicating agents' memory of past classifiers. Our results demonstrate how withholding access to the classifier can backfire and degrade the decision-maker's performance in online strategic classification.
