# Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.17885 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.17885/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 23 May 2025.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.14642/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions include: - We propose an extensive-form (multi-stage) game model to reason about the game theory of multi-proposer transaction fee mechanisms. - We define the strongly BPIC property to capture the idea that all block producers should be motivated to behave as intended: for every user bid profile, following the intended allocation rule is a Nash equilibrium for block producers that Pareto dominates all other Nash equilibria. - We propose the first-price auction with equal sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism as an attractive solution to the multi-proposer transaction fee mechanism design problem. We prove that the mechanism is strongly BPIC and guarantees at least a 63.2% fraction of the maximum-possible expected welfare at equilibrium. - We prove that the compromises made by the FPA-EQ mechanism are qualitatively necessary: no strongly BPIC mechanism with non-trivial welfare guarantees can be DSIC, and no strongly BPIC mechanism can guarantee optimal welfare at equilibrium.