# Self-Destructive Language Model

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.12186 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.12186/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 64 of its 96 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 18 May 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails](https://mlsanity.com/safety/safety-alignment-refusal-and-guardrails/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 64)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.09685/) (2021)
- [LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.13971/) (2023)
- [Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.14168/) (2021)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.03300/) (2020)
- [Qwen2.5 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.15115/) (2024)
- [Finetuned Language Models Are Zero-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.01652/) (2021)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Character-level Convolutional Networks for Text Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1509.01626/) (2015)
- [Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03693/) (2023)
- [Optimization Methods for Large-Scale Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.04838/) (2016)
- [Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11717/) (2024)
- [BeaverTails: Towards Improved Safety Alignment of LLM via a Human-Preference Dataset](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.04657/) (2023)
- [MathQA: Towards Interpretable Math Word Problem Solving with Operation-Based Formalisms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.13319/) (2019)
- [The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03218/) (2024)
- [XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.01263/) (2023)
- [Negative Preference Optimization: From Catastrophic Collapse to Effective Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.05868/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.13860/) (2023)
- [Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05946/) (2024)
- [Safety-Tuned LLaMAs: Lessons From Improving the Safety of Large Language Models that Follow Instructions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.07875/) (2023)
- [Alignment faking in large language models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.14093/) (2024)
- [Large Language Model Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10683/) (2023)
- [Shadow Alignment: The Ease of Subverting Safely-Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.02949/) (2023)
- [Rethinking Machine Unlearning for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08787/) (2024)
- [OR-Bench: An Over-Refusal Benchmark for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.20947/) (2024)
- [Assessing the Brittleness of Safety Alignment via Pruning and Low-Rank Modifications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.05162/) (2024)
- [COLD-Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs with Stealthiness and Controllability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08679/) (2024)
- [Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.17424/) (2025)
- [Safety Fine-Tuning at (Almost) No Cost: A Baseline for Vision Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.02207/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Gradient Surgery for Safe LLM Fine-Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.07172/) (2025)
- [Reasoning or Retrieval? A Study of Answer Attribution on Large Reasoning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.24156/) (2025)
- [Token Buncher: Shielding LLMs from Harmful Reinforcement Learning Fine-Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.20697/) (2025)
- [Antibody: Strengthening Defense Against Harmful Fine-Tuning for Large Language Models via Attenuating Harmful Gradient Influence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.00498/) (2026)
- [Surgery: Mitigating Harmful Fine-Tuning for Large Language Models via Attention Sink](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.05228/) (2026)
- [Efficient Cold-Start Recommendation via BPE Token-Level Embedding Initialization with LLM](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.13179/) (2025)
- [ConspirED: A Dataset for Cognitive Traits of Conspiracy Theories and Large Language Model Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.20468/) (2025)
- [Open-Weight LLM Fine-Tuning Defenses are Susceptible to Simple Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.26526/) (2026)
- [Hypergraph and Latent ODE Learning for Multimodal Root Cause Localization in Microservices](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.00351/) (2026)
- [SafeTune: A Unified Faithful Library for Auditing and Repairing Safety Drift in Fine-Tuned LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.22153/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Harmful fine-tuning attacks pose a major threat to the security of large language models (LLMs), allowing adversaries to compromise safety guardrails with minimal harmful data. While existing defenses attempt to reinforce LLM alignment, they fail to address models' inherent "trainability" on harmful data, leaving them vulnerable to stronger attacks with increased learning rates or larger harmful datasets. To overcome this critical limitation, we introduce SEAM, a novel alignment-enhancing defense that transforms LLMs into self-destructive models with intrinsic resilience to misalignment attempts. Specifically, these models retain their capabilities for legitimate tasks while exhibiting substantial performance degradation when fine-tuned on harmful data. The protection is achieved through a novel loss function that couples the optimization trajectories of benign and harmful data, enhanced with adversarial gradient ascent to amplify the self-destructive effect. To enable practical training, we develop an efficient Hessian-free gradient estimate with theoretical error bounds. Extensive evaluation across LLMs and datasets demonstrates that SEAM creates a no-win situation for adversaries: the self-destructive models achieve state-of-the-art robustness against low-intensity attacks and undergo catastrophic performance collapse under high-intensity attacks, rendering them effectively unusable. The code is available: https://github.com/ZJUWYH/seam. (Warning: this paper contains potentially harmful content generated by LLMs.)