# Why Not Act on What You Know? Unleashing Safety Potential of LLMs via Self-Aware Guard Enhancement

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.12060 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.12060/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 30 of its 42 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 17 May 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 30)

- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.14168/) (2021)
- [Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.03300/) (2020)
- [Qwen2.5 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.15115/) (2024)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.00614/) (2023)
- [How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.06373/) (2024)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.14132/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06387/) (2023)
- [DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.03191/) (2023)
- [A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easily](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.08268/) (2023)
- [The Unlocking Spell on Base LLMs: Rethinking Alignment via In-Context Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.01552/) (2023)
- [Pretraining Language Models with Human Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.08582/) (2023)
- [SafeDecoding: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks via Safety-Aware Decoding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08983/) (2024)
- [LLM Self Defense: By Self Examination, LLMs Know They Are Being Tricked](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.07308/) (2023)
- [Defending Against Alignment-Breaking Attacks via Robustly Aligned LLM](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.14348/) (2023)
- [Mitigating the Alignment Tax of RLHF](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.06256/) (2023)
- [Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks Through Goal Prioritization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.09096/) (2023)
- [Attacks, Defenses and Evaluations for LLM Conversation Safety: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.09283/) (2024)
- [The Ethics of Advanced AI Assistants](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16244/) (2024)
- [How Alignment and Jailbreak Work: Explain LLM Safety through Intermediate Hidden States](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05644/) (2024)
- [CodeAttack: Revealing Safety Generalization Challenges of Large Language Models via Code Completion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.07865/) (2024)
- [Intention Analysis Makes LLMs A Good Jailbreak Defender](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.06561/) (2024)
- [Self-Guard: Empower the LLM to Safeguard Itself](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.15851/) (2023)
- [CodeAttack: Code-Based Adversarial Attacks for Pre-trained Programming Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.00052/) (2022)
- [Mitigating Fine-tuning based Jailbreak Attack with Backdoor Enhanced Safety Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.14968/) (2024)
- [Can Large Language Models Understand Context?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.00858/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [ObjexMT: Objective Extraction and Metacognitive Calibration for LLM-as-a-Judge under Multi-Turn Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.16889/) (2025)
- [AISA: Awakening Intrinsic Safety Awareness in Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.13547/) (2026)
- [THRD: A Training-Free Multi-Turn Defense Framework for Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.01738/) (2026)
- [Overlooked Safety Vulnerability in LLMs: Malicious Intelligent Optimization Algorithm Request and its Jailbreak](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.00213/) (2026)
- [SDGO: Self-Discrimination-Guided Optimization for Consistent Safety in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.15648/) (2025)
- [A Systematic Study of Training-Free Methods for Trustworthy Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.15789/) (2026)
- [Decoy Images Amplify Caption-Mediated Defenses Against Encoded Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.01043/) (2026)
- [Refusing Everything Looks Safe: Restoring the Benign Arm to Encoded-Prompt Evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.26176/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks but remain vulnerable to meticulously crafted jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we identify a critical safety gap: while LLMs are adept at detecting jailbreak prompts, they often produce unsafe responses when directly processing these inputs. Inspired by this insight, we propose SAGE (Self-Aware Guard Enhancement), a training-free defense strategy designed to align LLMs' strong safety discrimination performance with their relatively weaker safety generation ability. SAGE consists of two core components: a Discriminative Analysis Module and a Discriminative Response Module, enhancing resilience against sophisticated jailbreak attempts through flexible safety discrimination instructions. Extensive experiments demonstrate SAGE's effectiveness and robustness across various open-source and closed-source LLMs of different sizes and architectures, achieving an average 99% defense success rate against numerous complex and covert jailbreak methods while maintaining helpfulness on general benchmarks. We further conduct mechanistic interpretability analysis through hidden states and attention distributions, revealing the underlying mechanisms of this detection-generation discrepancy. Our work thus contributes to developing future LLMs with coherent safety awareness and generation behavior. Our code and datasets are publicly available at https://github.com/NJUNLP/SAGE.