# AutoRAN: Automated Hijacking of Safety Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.10846 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.10846/

## Key facts

- Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Reasoning for agents, planning and code, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning.
- Builds on 41 of its 47 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 16 May 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM reasoning / [Reasoning for agents, planning and code](https://mlsanity.com/lr/reasoning-for-agents-planning-and-code/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 41)

- [Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.11903/) (2022)
- [DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.03300/) (2024)
- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Tree of Thoughts: Deliberate Problem Solving with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.10601/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Understanding R1-Zero-Like Training: A Critical Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.20783/) (2025)
- [s1: Simple test-time scaling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.19393/) (2025)
- [Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06674/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.06373/) (2024)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.01263/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06387/) (2023)
- [GPT-4 Is Too Smart To Be Safe: Stealthy Chat with LLMs via Cipher](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.06463/) (2023)
- [A StrongREJECT for Empty Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.10260/) (2024)
- [Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses Against Large Language Models: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.04295/) (2024)
- [AutoDAN-Turbo: A Lifelong Agent for Strategy Self-Exploration to Jailbreak LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.05295/) (2024)
- [AmpleGCG: Learning a Universal and Transferable Generative Model of Adversarial Suffixes for Jailbreaking Both Open and Closed LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.07921/) (2024)
- [Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks Through Goal Prioritization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.09096/) (2023)
- [Free Process Rewards without Process Labels](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.01981/) (2024)
- [AdvPrompter: Fast Adaptive Adversarial Prompting for LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16873/) (2024)
- [SafeChain: Safety of Language Models with Long Chain-of-Thought Reasoning Capabilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.12025/) (2025)
- [Open Sesame! Universal Black Box Jailbreaking of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.01446/) (2023)
- [LLMs Can Easily Learn to Reason from Demonstrations Structure, not content, is what matters!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.07374/) (2025)
- [AutoDAN: Interpretable Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.15140/) (2023)
- [Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking on Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.17256/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [A Comprehensive Survey on Trustworthiness in Reasoning with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.03871/) (2025)
- [Chain-of-Thought Hijacking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.26418/) (2025)
- [Strong but Brittle: Simple Attacks Subvert Reasoning-based Safety Guardrails](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.11570/) (2025)
- [Do Reasoning LLMs Refuse What They Infer in Long Contexts?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.08874/) (2026)
- [Red Teaming Large Reasoning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.00412/) (2025)
- [Safety Context Injection: Inference-Time Safety Alignment via Static Filtering and Agentic Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.11664/) (2026)
- [Attention-Guided Reward for Reinforcement Learning-based Jailbreak against Large Reasoning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.19485/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This paper presents AutoRAN, the first framework to automate the hijacking of internal safety reasoning in large reasoning models (LRMs). At its core, AutoRAN pioneers an execution simulation paradigm that leverages a weaker but less-aligned model to simulate execution reasoning for initial hijacking attempts and iteratively refine attacks by exploiting reasoning patterns leaked through the target LRM's refusals. This approach steers the target model to bypass its own safety guardrails and elaborate on harmful instructions. We evaluate AutoRAN against state-of-the-art LRMs, including GPT-o3/o4-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across multiple benchmarks (AdvBench, HarmBench, and StrongReject). Results show that AutoRAN achieves approaching 100% success rate within one or few turns, effectively neutralizing reasoning-based defenses even when evaluated by robustly aligned external models. This work reveals that the transparency of the reasoning process itself creates a critical and exploitable attack surface, highlighting the urgent need for new defenses that protect models' reasoning traces rather than merely their final outputs.