# Spatial public goods games with queueing and reputation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.09154 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09154/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 14 May 2025.

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [TUC-PPO: Team Utility-Constrained Proximal Policy Optimization for Spatial Public Goods Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.02675/) (2025)
- [Coordinated incentives in AI-generated misinformation governance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.07070/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

In real-world social and economic systems, the provisioning of public goods generally entails continuous interactions among individuals, with decisions to cooperate or defect being influenced by dynamic factors such as timing, resource availability, and the duration of engagement. However, the traditional public goods game ignores the asynchrony of the strategy adopted by players in the game. To address this problem, we propose a spatial public goods game that integrates an M/M/1 queueing system to simulate the dynamic flow of player interactions. We use a birth-death process to characterize the stochastic dynamics of this queueing system, with players arriving following a Poisson process and service times being exponentially distributed under a first-come-first-served basis with finite queue capacity. We also incorporate reputation so that players who have cooperated in the past are more likely to be chosen for future interactions. Our research shows that a high arrival rate, low service rate, and the reputation mechanism jointly facilitate the emergence of cooperative individuals in the network, which thus provides an interesting and new perspective for the provisioning of public goods.