# Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.06312 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.06312/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 4 of its 31 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 8 May 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [A Game-Theoretic Account of Responsibility Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.09129/) (2021)
- [Together We Know How to Achieve: An Epistemic Logic of Know-How](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.09349/) (2017)
- [Strategically knowing how](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.05254/) (2017)
- [Blameworthiness in Security Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.08647/) (2019)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Responsibility Gap and Diffusion in Sequential Decision-Making Mechanisms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.02582/) (2025)
- [Peer Oversight in Collective Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.28754/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The responsibility gap is a set of outcomes of a collective decision-making mechanism in which no single agent is individually responsible. In general, when designing a decision-making process, it is desirable to minimise the gap. The paper proposes a concept of an elected dictatorship. It shows that, in a perfect information setting, the gap is empty if and only if the mechanism is an elected dictatorship. It also proves that in an imperfect information setting, the class of gap-free mechanisms is positioned strictly between two variations of the class of elected dictatorships.