# Neurodivergent Influenceability as a Contingent Solution to the AI Alignment Problem

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.02581 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.02581/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Human values and AI feedback alignment, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation.
- Builds on 4 of its 24 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 5 May 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Human values and AI feedback alignment](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/human-values-and-ai-feedback-alignment/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [RoBERTa: A Robustly Optimized BERT Pretraining Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.11692/) (2019)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Inverse reinforcement learning for video games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.10593/) (2018)
- [Can Complexity and Uncomputability Explain Intelligence? SuperARC: A Test for Artificial Super Intelligence Based on Recursive Compression](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.16743/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The AI alignment problem, which focusses on ensuring that artificial intelligence (AI), including AGI and ASI, systems act according to human values, presents profound challenges. With the progression from narrow AI to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Superintelligence, fears about control and existential risk have escalated. Here, we investigate whether embracing inevitable AI misalignment can be a contingent strategy to foster a dynamic ecosystem of competing agents as a viable path to steer them in more human-aligned trends and mitigate risks. We explore how misalignment may serve and should be promoted as a counterbalancing mechanism to team up with whichever agents are most aligned to human interests, ensuring that no single system dominates destructively. The main premise of our contribution is that misalignment is inevitable because full AI-human alignment is a mathematical impossibility from Turing-complete systems, which we also offer as a proof in this contribution, a feature then inherited to AGI and ASI systems. We introduce a change-of-opinion attack test based on perturbation and intervention analysis to study how humans and agents may change or neutralise friendly and unfriendly AIs through cooperation and competition. We show that open models are more diverse and that most likely guardrails implemented in proprietary models are successful at controlling some of the agents' range of behaviour with positive and negative consequences while closed systems are more steerable and can also be used against proprietary AI systems. We also show that human and AI intervention has different effects hence suggesting multiple strategies.