# Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Black-Box Vision-Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.01050 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.01050/

## Key facts

- Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models.
- Builds on 62 of its 78 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 May 2025.

## Placed in

- Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models / [MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness](https://mlsanity.com/mllm/mllm-jailbreaks-and-adversarial-robustness/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 62)

- [Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1512.03385/) (2015)
- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [GPT-4 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08774/) (2023)
- [Microsoft COCO: Common Objects in Context](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1405.0312/) (2014)
- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [DINOv2: Learning Robust Visual Features without Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.07193/) (2023)
- [Visual Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.08485/) (2023)
- [Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6572/) (2014)
- [Densely Connected Convolutional Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1608.06993/) (2016)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [Qwen2.5-VL Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.13923/) (2025)
- [Intriguing properties of neural networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.6199/) (2013)
- [Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05530/) (2024)
- [Sigmoid Loss for Language Image Pre-Training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.15343/) (2023)
- [RT-2: Vision-Language-Action Models Transfer Web Knowledge to Robotic Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15818/) (2023)
- [MiniGPT-4: Enhancing Vision-Language Understanding with Advanced Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.10592/) (2023)
- [Large Language Models Encode Clinical Knowledge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.13138/) (2022)
- [SWE-agent: Agent-Computer Interfaces Enable Automated Software Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15793/) (2024)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08419/) (2023)
- [Sharpness-Aware Minimization for Efficiently Improving Generalization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2010.01412/) (2020)
- [Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.02918/) (2019)
- [Averaging Weights Leads to Wider Optima and Better Generalization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.05407/) (2018)
- [Deep Networks with Stochastic Depth](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1603.09382/) (2016)
- [Vision Transformers Need Registers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.16588/) (2023)
- [AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.04451/) (2023)
- [Evasion Attacks against Machine Learning at Test Time](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.06131/) (2017)
- [Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.00614/) (2023)
- [LLaVA-NeXT-Interleave: Tackling Multi-image, Video, and 3D in Large Multimodal Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.07895/) (2024)
- [Eureka: Human-Level Reward Design via Coding Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.12931/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 10 of 10)

- [Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.20526/) (2025)
- [How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.15714/) (2026)
- [AdInject: Real-World Black-Box Attacks on Web Agents via Advertising Delivery](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.21499/) (2025)
- [Black-box Optimization of LLM Outputs by Asking for Directions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.16794/) (2025)
- [Adversarial Confusion Attack: Disrupting Multimodal Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.20494/) (2025)
- [Frequency-Domain Regularized Adversarial Alignment for Transferable Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.21541/) (2026)
- [Steal the Patch Size: Adversarially Manipulate Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.00174/) (2026)
- [Understanding Adversarial Transfer: Why Representation-Space Attacks Fail Where Data-Space Attacks Succeed](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.01494/) (2025)
- [Universal Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Target-View Routed Meta Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.23179/) (2026)
- [Still There, No Longer Seen: Exposing Compression-Induced Risk in Large Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.35002/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) are increasingly deployed to offer advanced capabilities on inputs comprising both text and images. While prior research has shown that adversarial attacks can transfer from open-source to proprietary black-box models in text-only and vision-only contexts, the extent and effectiveness of such vulnerabilities remain underexplored for VLLMs. We present a comprehensive analysis demonstrating that targeted adversarial examples are highly transferable to widely-used proprietary VLLMs such as GPT-4o, Claude, and Gemini. We show that attackers can craft perturbations to induce specific attacker-chosen interpretations of visual information, such as misinterpreting hazardous content as safe, overlooking sensitive or restricted material, or generating detailed incorrect responses aligned with the attacker's intent. Furthermore, we discover that universal perturbations -- modifications applicable to a wide set of images -- can consistently induce these misinterpretations across multiple proprietary VLLMs. Our experimental results on object recognition, visual question answering, and image captioning show that this vulnerability is common across current state-of-the-art models, and underscore an urgent need for robust mitigations to ensure the safe and secure deployment of VLLMs.