# When Memory Becomes a Vulnerability: Towards Multi-turn Jailbreak Attacks against Text-to-Image Generation Systems

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.20376 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.20376/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Vision-language and text-to-image safety, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 31 of its 72 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 Apr 2025.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Vision-language and text-to-image safety](https://mlsanity.com/safety/vision-language-and-text-to-image-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 31)

- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.11239/) (2020)
- [High-Resolution Image Synthesis with Latent Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.10752/) (2021)
- [Deep Unsupervised Learning using Nonequilibrium Thermodynamics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1503.03585/) (2015)
- [SDXL: Improving Latent Diffusion Models for High-Resolution Image Synthesis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.01952/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [Safe Latent Diffusion: Mitigating Inappropriate Degeneration in Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.05105/) (2022)
- [Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.14132/) (2023)
- [Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.01833/) (2024)
- [Red-Teaming the Stable Diffusion Safety Filter](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.04610/) (2022)
- [Ring-A-Bell! How Reliable are Concept Removal Methods for Diffusion Models?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10012/) (2023)
- [MMA-Diffusion: MultiModal Attack on Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17516/) (2023)
- [SneakyPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.12082/) (2023)
- [Unsafe Diffusion: On the Generation of Unsafe Images and Hateful Memes From Text-To-Image Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.13873/) (2023)
- [Can Machines Help Us Answering Question 16 in Datasheets, and In Turn Reflecting on Inappropriate Content?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.06675/) (2022)
- [Llama Guard 3 Vision: Safeguarding Human-AI Image Understanding Conversations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.10414/) (2024)
- [DrAttack: Prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction Makes Powerful LLM Jailbreakers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.16914/) (2024)
- [Chain of Attack: a Semantic-Driven Contextual Multi-Turn attacker for LLM](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.05610/) (2024)
- [Speak Out of Turn: Safety Vulnerability of Large Language Models in Multi-turn Dialogue](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.17262/) (2024)
- [Foot-In-The-Door: A Multi-turn Jailbreak for LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.19820/) (2025)
- [Language Model as an Annotator: Exploring DialoGPT for Dialogue Summarization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.12544/) (2021)
- [Perception-guided Jailbreak against Text-to-Image Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.10848/) (2024)
- [All Seeds Are Not Equal: Enhancing Compositional Text-to-Image Generation with Reliable Random Seeds](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.18810/) (2024)
- [On the Evolution of (Hateful) Memes by Means of Multimodal Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.06573/) (2022)
- [Automatic Jailbreaking of the Text-to-Image Generative AI Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.16567/) (2024)
- [MLLM-as-a-Judge for Image Safety without Human Labeling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.00192/) (2024)
- [DiffZOO: A Purely Query-Based Black-Box Attack for Red-teaming Text-to-Image Generative Model via Zeroth Order Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.11071/) (2024)
- [Understanding Multi-Turn Toxic Behaviors in Open-Domain Chatbots](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.09579/) (2023)
- [Moderating Illicit Online Image Promotion for Unsafe User-Generated Content Games Using Large Vision-Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.18957/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Cannot See the Forest for the Trees: Invoking Heuristics and Biases to Elicit Irrational Choices of LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.02862/) (2025)
- [Three Minds, One Legend: Jailbreak Large Reasoning Model with Adaptive Stacked Ciphers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.16241/) (2025)
- [SoK: Intent-Oriented Systematization of Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.01117/) (2026)
- [Innocent Panels, Hateful Stories: Evaluating and Detecting Hateful Intent in Multi-Turn Visual Story Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.05210/) (2026)
- [When Scene Text Hijacks the Scene: Uncovering, Exploiting, and Mitigating Rendered-Text Semantic Leakage in Image Generation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.11286/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Modern text-to-image (T2I) generation systems (e.g., DALL·E 3) exploit the memory mechanism, which captures key information in multi-turn interactions for faithful generation. Despite its practicality, the security analyses of this mechanism have fallen far behind. In this paper, we reveal that it can exacerbate the risk of jailbreak attacks. Previous attacks fuse the unsafe target prompt into one ultimate adversarial prompt, which can be easily detected or lead to the generation of non-unsafe images due to under- or over-detoxification. In contrast, we propose embedding the malice at the inception of the chat session in memory, addressing the above limitations. Specifically, we propose Inception, the first multi-turn jailbreak attack against real-world text-to-image generation systems that explicitly exploits their memory mechanisms. Inception is composed of two key modules: segmentation and recursion. We introduce Segmentation, a semantic-preserving method that generates multi-round prompts. By leveraging NLP analysis techniques, we design policies to decompose a prompt, together with its malicious intent, according to sentence structure, thereby evading safety filters. Recursion further addresses the challenge posed by unsafe sub-prompts that cannot be separated through simple segmentation. It firstly expands the sub-prompt, then invokes segmentation recursively. To facilitate multi-turn adversarial prompts crafting, we build VisionFlow, an emulation T2I system that integrates two-stage safety filters and industrial-grade memory mechanisms. The experiment results show that Inception successfully allures unsafe image generation, surpassing the SOTA by a 20.0% margin in attack success rate. We also conduct experiments on the real-world commercial T2I generation platforms, further validating the threats of Inception in practice.