# Cooperative Speech, Semantic Competence, and AI

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.16092 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.16092/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 2 of its 49 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 Mar 2025.

## Builds on (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Improving alignment of dialogue agents via targeted human judgements](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.14375/) (2022)
- [Do Language Models' Words Refer?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.05576/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Talking with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.09064/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Cooperative speech is purposive. From the speaker's perspective, one crucial purpose is the transmission of knowledge. Cooperative speakers care about getting things right for their conversational partners. This attitude is a kind of respect. Cooperative speech is an ideal form of communication because participants have respect for each other. And having respect within a cooperative enterprise is sufficient for a particular kind of moral standing: we ought to respect those who have respect for us. Respect demands reciprocity. I maintain that large language models aren't owed the kind of respect that partly constitutes a cooperative conversation. This implies that they aren't cooperative interlocutors, otherwise we would be obliged to reciprocate the attitude. Leveraging this conclusion, I argue that present-day LLMs are incapable of assertion and that this raises an overlooked doubt about their semantic competence. One upshot of this argument is that knowledge of meaning isn't just a subject for the cognitive psychologist. It's also a subject for the moral psychologist.