# One Pic is All it Takes: Poisoning Visual Document Retrieval Augmented Generation with a Single Image

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.02132 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.02132/

## Key facts

- Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation.
- Builds on 43 of its 55 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Apr 2025.

## Placed in

- Retrieval-augmented generation / [Privacy and security of RAG](https://mlsanity.com/rag/privacy-and-security-of-rag/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 43)

- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.11401/) (2020)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Visual Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.08485/) (2023)
- [Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6572/) (2014)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [GPT-4o System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21276/) (2024)
- [Qwen2-VL: Enhancing Vision-Language Model's Perception of the World at Any Resolution](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.12191/) (2024)
- [Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1608.04644/) (2016)
- [UMAP: Uniform Manifold Approximation and Projection for Dimension Reduction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.03426/) (2018)
- [Adversarial examples in the physical world](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1607.02533/) (2016)
- [A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models: Principles, Taxonomy, Challenges, and Open Questions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.05232/) (2023)
- [ColBERT: Efficient and Effective Passage Search via Contextualized Late Interaction over BERT](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.12832/) (2020)
- [Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.02697/) (2016)
- [Mind the Gap: Understanding the Modality Gap in Multi-modal Contrastive Representation Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02053/) (2022)
- [VLMEvalKit: An Open-Source Toolkit for Evaluating Large Multi-Modality Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.11691/) (2024)
- [MLLM-as-a-Judge: Assessing Multimodal LLM-as-a-Judge with Vision-Language Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04788/) (2024)
- [PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07867/) (2024)
- [Nougat: Neural Optical Understanding for Academic Documents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.13418/) (2023)
- [VisRAG: Vision-based Retrieval-augmented Generation on Multi-modality Documents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.10594/) (2024)
- [MuRAG: Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generator for Open Question Answering over Images and Text](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.02928/) (2022)
- [ColPali: Efficient Document Retrieval with Vision Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.01449/) (2024)
- [An Introduction to Vision-Language Modeling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.17247/) (2024)
- [GME: Improving Universal Multimodal Retrieval by Multimodal LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.16855/) (2024)
- [Agent Smith: A Single Image Can Jailbreak One Million Multimodal LLM Agents Exponentially Fast](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08567/) (2024)
- [Certifiably Robust RAG against Retrieval Corruption](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15556/) (2024)
- [jina-embeddings-v3: Multilingual Embeddings With Task LoRA](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.10173/) (2024)
- [mPLUG-DocOwl2: High-resolution Compressing for OCR-free Multi-page Document Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.03420/) (2024)
- [Machine Against the RAG: Jamming Retrieval-Augmented Generation with Blocker Documents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05870/) (2024)
- [Retrieval Augmented Visual Question Answering with Outside Knowledge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03809/) (2022)

## Built on by (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.07072/) (2026)
- [Scaling Beyond Context: A Survey of Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Document Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.15253/) (2025)
- [Visual Inception: Compromising Long-term Planning in Agentic Recommenders via Multimodal Memory Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.16966/) (2026)
- [SoK: The Pitfalls of Deep Reinforcement Learning for Cybersecurity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.08690/) (2026)
- [Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.08304/) (2026)
- [Do Agents Dream of False Memories? Black-box Visual Attacks on Long-term Memory in Multimodal AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.15657/) (2026)
- [Vis-Poison: Poisoning Visual Knowledge in Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.20756/) (2026)
- [REPLICANT: Learning Policies for Evading and Hardening Malware Detectors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.28499/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is instrumental for inhibiting hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) through the use of a factual knowledge base (KB). Although PDF documents are prominent sources of knowledge, text-based RAG pipelines are ineffective at capturing their rich multi-modal information. In contrast, visual document RAG (VD-RAG) uses screenshots of document pages as the KB, which has been shown to achieve state-of-the-art results. However, by introducing the image modality, VD-RAG introduces new attack vectors for adversaries to disrupt the system by injecting malicious documents into the KB. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of VD-RAG to poisoning attacks targeting both retrieval and generation. We define two attack objectives and demonstrate that both can be realized by injecting only a single adversarial image into the KB. Firstly, we introduce a targeted attack against one or a group of queries with the goal of spreading targeted disinformation. Secondly, we present a universal attack that, for any potential user query, influences the response to cause a denial-of-service in the VD-RAG system. We investigate the two attack objectives under both white-box and black-box assumptions, employing a multi-objective gradient-based optimization approach as well as prompting state-of-the-art generative models. Using two visual document datasets, a diverse set of state-of-the-art retrievers (embedding models) and generators (vision language models), we show VD-RAG is vulnerable to poisoning attacks in both the targeted and universal settings, yet demonstrating robustness to black-box attacks in the universal setting.